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I.

INTRODUCTION

Reservations are, perennially and by acclamation, one of the most
1
complex and controversial parts of treaty law. The idea is simple—states may
ask that treaty terms be tailored to their individual preferences, turning a prix
fixe menu à la carte2—and critical to establishing and applying international

†
Associate Professor, The Wharton School and the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. I have benefited from helpful suggestions made on earlier drafts by workshop participants at the
Wharton School and at Boalt Hall, Georgetown, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, Temple, and
Vanderbilt law schools.
1.
After quoting submissions that reservations were “of unusual—in fact baffling—
complexity” and of “considerably obscurity in the realm of juristic speculation,” Anthony Aust indicates
that such views “are even truer today.” ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 100
(2000); see also J.M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 97, 101 (1975) (noting
controversial character).
2.
More formally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a reservation as “a
unilateral statement, however phrased or named . . . whereby [a State] purports to exclude or to modify
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obligations. But the same issues have bedeviled the law for over fifty years,
notwithstanding repeated attempts to resolve them. Shortly after the United
Nations was founded, the General Assembly sought and obtained advice on
reservations from the International Court of Justice3 and the International Law
4
Commission, then adopted a resolution characterized as “one of the
5
fundamental documents in the history of the law of treaties.” Fifteen years of
further debate produced an important section of the Vienna Convention on the
6
Law of Treaties that governs, by default, how reservations are handled.
Basically, states are not supposed to propose reservations that are
incompatible with a treaty’s “object and purpose.” But if a state proposes a
reservation, and another state does not object within a year, the reservation is
said to modify the treaty as between them.
This leaves many, if not most, important issues unresolved. Suppose
Canada ratifies a multilateral treaty prohibiting seal hunts, but with a
reservation that would exempt its native peoples. If that reservation conflicts
with the treaty’s object and purpose—say, because the whole point was to
constrain traditional harvesting of that kind—is the reservation automatically
ineffective, or ineffective only as against states that object on a timely basis?
Assuming no state objects, how should a tribunal or a treaty monitoring body
react if Canada’s reservation comes up later—should it permit Canada to
benefit from the reservation, conclude that the reservation renders Canada a
non-party to the treaty, or apply the treaty without regard to the reservation?
Shouldn’t Canada, in any event, have some idea about all this before it
ratifies?
International organizations are trying, at least at the margins, to clear this
all up. Over the last decade, a Special Rapporteur for the International Law
Commission has produced near-annual reports of extraordinary length and
the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.” Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Two subsequent conventions, which have extremely similar terms but
are of more limited application, will not be separately discussed here. See Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22, 1978, 1946 U.N.T.S. 3; Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations,
Mar. 21, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543.
3.
G.A. Res. 478, ¶ 1, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/1494 (Nov. 16, 1950); see
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory
Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
4.
G.A. Res. 478, supra note 3, ¶ 2; see Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n 123, 125, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.1 [hereinafter 1951 ILC Report]. The ILC
had already been considering the matter. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
TREATIES 1945-1986, at 424-25 (1989).
5.
ROSENNE , supra note 4, at 430; see G.A. Res. 598 (VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/L.37 (Jan. 12, 1952).
6.
The Convention is formally limited to treaties concluded after the Convention itself came
into force in 1980, with respect to states that are themselves parties to the Convention. Vienna
Convention, supra note 2, art. 4. But it is often invoked under other circumstances, see, e.g., Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24, ¶ 6 n.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11,
1994) [hereinafter General Comment 24] (invoking the Vienna Convention in connection with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)), and accepted by non-parties, see Richard
W. Edwards, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT ’L L. 363, 365-67 (1989) (citing examples and
claiming that “[s]tates that would challenge the Vienna Convention rules concerning reservations carry
the burden to demonstrate that the rules they challenge are today not de lege lata”).
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detail. Notwithstanding this effort, the Commission has indicated that it seeks
only to clarify (rather than modify) the Vienna Convention, 8 and the
9
guidelines it has drafted to date are relatively modest in their ambition.
Others have pitched in. The Human Rights Committee, having taken an
10
aggressive stance against reservations to human rights treaties, established a
11
working group on the issue, and a sub-commission of the Commission on
Human Rights12 considered itself in a “battle” within the United Nations over
13
reservations. Regional organizations like the Council of Europe have also
shown considerable interest in revising reservations law and practice.14

7.
See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Tenth Report on Reservations to
Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/558 (June 1, 2005) (prepared by Alain Pellet) [hereinafter Special
Rapporteur, Tenth Report]; Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Tenth Report on Reservations to
Treaties, First Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.1 (June 14, 2005) (prepared by Alain Pellet)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add.]; Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n,
Tenth Report on Reservations to Treaties, Second Addendum, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/558/Add.2 (Jun. 30,
2005) (prepared by Alain Pellet) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add.].
In addition, the Commission’s proceedings are summarized in annual reports, e.g., Int’l Law
Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Seventh Session, U.N.
Doc. A/60/10 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 ILC Report], and the Special Rapporteur’s work is also
appraised in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Sixth Session: Topical Summary of the
Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Its Fifty-Ninth Session, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/549 (Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Topical Summary 2005]. Finally, progress reports are
regularly published in the secondary literature. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Christopher C. Mosley,
The Work of the International Law Commission at Its Fifty-Fifth Session (2003), 73 NORDIC J. INT ’L L.
99 (2004).
8.
See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of
Its Forty-Seventh Session, ¶ 491, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995) (reporting a “consensus in the Commission
that there should be no change in the relevant provisions of the 1969, 1978, and 1986 Vienna
Conventions” regarding reservations); cf. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Ninth Session, ¶ 157, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
ILC Report] (setting out Commission’s preliminary conclusions). The most significant exceptions are
likely to be the provisions regarding interpretive declarations, on which the Convention is silent; in such
instances, the plan appears to be to codify international practice. See Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law
Comm’n, Third Report on Reservations to Treaties, Third Addendum, ¶¶ 228-232, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/491/Add.3 (June 19, 1998) (prepared by Alain Pellet) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Third
Report, Third Add.].
9.
See, e.g., 2005 ILC Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 437-38 (reprinting draft guidelines adopted to
date, with commentary). These draft guidelines remain subject to final adoption, following a second
reading.
10. Accord Kennedy v. Trin. & Tobago, Communication No. 845/1999, Annex, ¶¶ 6.6-6.7,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/67/D/845/1999 (Nov. 2, 1999), reprinted in 2 Human Rights Comm., Annual Report
of the Human Rights Committee for 2000, at 258-72, U.N. Doc. A/55/40 (2000) (deciding that
reservation deemed inconsistent with the ICCPR and its Protocols would not preclude the admissibility
of an individual complaint). See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. See generally General
Comment 24, supra note 6.
11. Press Release, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Human Rights
Committee Decides To Set up Working Groups on Reservations and on Streamlining Reporting
Procedures Among Treaty Bodies (Oct. 31, 2002), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
SearchFormtest1.nsf/Web+Search+Simple?OpenForm (search “working groups on reservations” and
follow the hyperlink corresponding to Oct. 31, 2002).
12. The nomenclature is potentially confusing. The Human Rights Commission, a U.N.
agency under the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), was distinct from the Human Rights
Committee—a treaty-based body responsible for the ICCPR, and the author of the aforementioned
General Comment No. 24.
13. Press Release, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Subcommission
Continues Debate on Rights of Children, Freedom of Religion and International Terrorism, U.N. Doc.
HR/SC/98/29 (Aug. 24, 1998). The Subcommission subsequently agreed, however, to a (temporary)
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Despite conflict within these initiatives and academia about the best
solution, there is wide agreement about the character of existing law: namely,
that there is a sharp tradeoff between honoring the consent of non-reserving
states (who, with respect to another state’s reservation, would for those
limited purposes take the treaty as originally negotiated) and respecting the
15
conditioned consent of reserving states, and that the Vienna Convention
decisively favors the latter,16 upsetting an intended balance between them.17
The pervasive ambiguities in the law of reservations are said to play a
supporting role. Whatever their cause, it is thought such ambiguities impair
the reservation regime’s progressive development, and tend to disadvantage
non-reserving states; the solution is to resolve the Convention’s ambiguities
and, to one degree or another, to make reservations harder to pull off. 18

ceasefire. U.N. ESCOR [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/42 (July 19, 2004) (prepared by Françoise Hampson) [hereinafter Hampson
Report].
14. See Council of Europe, Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation No. R(99)13 of the Comm.
of Ministers to Member States on Responses to Inadmissible Reservations to International Treaties,
670th Mtg. of the Ministers’ Deputies (May 18, 1999), available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/rec/
1999/99r13.htm [hereinafter Recommendation No. R(99)13]; Comm. of Legal Advisers on Pub. Int’l
Law (CAHDI), Practical Issues Regarding Reservations to International Treaties, 19th mtg., CM
(2000) 50, App. 4 (2000), available at https://wcm.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=348409&Lang=en
[hereinafter CAHDI, Practical Issues].
15. I use the term “non-reserving” rather than “objecting” to include states taking no overt
position regarding reservations proposed by others. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Reports of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 207, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/191 [hereinafter 1966 ILC Report]. As the text
suggests, “reserving” and “non-reserving” are each descriptions relating to a particular reservation or
prospect thereof, and are non-exclusive otherwise; that is, a state may be deemed “non-reserving” in
relation to another state’s proposed reservation, but may simultaneously enter reservations on its own
behalf with respect to the same treaty (even the same provision) or, of course, some other treaty.
16. See, e.g., Hampson Report, supra note 13, ¶ 26 (“The Vienna Convention regime favours
the reserving state.”); D.W. Greig, Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L
L. 295, 328 (1994) (criticizing the Vienna Convention’s reservation regime as “giv[ing] an unacceptable
advantage to the reserving state”); Jan Klabbers, Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Nordic Approach
to Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 69 NORDIC J. INT ’L L. 179, 179 (2000) (citing “discontent . . .
that whether a state would accept another state’s reservation or not, the reserving state would get what it
desired, unless the objecting state made known that its objections were so fundamental as to prevent the
entry into force of the treaty between the reserving and the objecting party”).
17. See, e.g., 52 BRIT . Y.B. INT’ L L. 437, 439 (1981) (written comments of the United
Kingdom, submitting that “the true counterpart to the right of one party to formulate a reservation is . . .
the inherent right of other parties to object . . . to that same reservation” and that “[a]ny other principle . .
. would destroy the crucial balance between contracting parties in respect of their mutual rights and
obligations, inasmuch as it would allow one party to impose its reservation upon others and thus, in
effect, to write its own treaty”); id. at 440 (describing treaty articles as fulfilling “the fundamental
principle of the greatest possible equality between Parties to a treaty, to regard the possibility of an
objection as the inherent and automatic corollary of the formulation of the reservation itself”);
Reservations, 14 Whiteman DIGEST § 17, at 140 [hereinafter Reservations] (noting rights of states to
attach any reservation, and the “right” of other states “to accept or reject such a reservation”).
18. See, e.g., Spanish Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice in Public International Law,
1995 and 1996, 4 SPANISH Y.B. INT ’L L. 107, 116 (1996) (remarks of Spanish representative at the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly) (“[T]he task now entrusted to the Commission . . . is precisely to
close . . . loopholes and clarify . . . ambiguities” in the reservations scheme); see infra text
accompanying notes 95-96.
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At least if we maintain the focus on state consent, this prevailing
understanding is seriously incomplete. It is easy to see how reservations
20
benefit the states making them. But the law of treaty reservations—if, and
only if, its ambiguities and apparent imperfections are included—also
plausibly serves the interests of its supposed victims, the non-reserving states.
Treaty reservations not only increase the breadth of treaty participation, as
they were certainly intended to do, but also permit agreement on deeper
commitments than would otherwise be possible. Reservations further help
establish an information-forcing mechanism that communicates significant
information about the risks and benefits of contracting with reserving states.
The regime’s eccentricities, finally, allow non-reserving states to “reserve”
their own judgment regarding the acceptability of reservations, and thus to
recapture some of the insurance benefits that reserving states capture in
exempting their future conduct.
Elaborating a theory of non-reserving state interests does not, of course,
resolve the reservation regime’s ambiguities as matter of treaty construction,
nor substitute for a serious normative analysis. The point, instead, is to better
understand the functions the existing law serves, on the simple premise that
the status quo should be better understood before it is fixed. This positive
account of reservations also lends itself to analyzing some of the reform
proposals presently before the International Law Commission; more
generally, it helps to advance a broader project on the positive analysis of
21
treaty escape mechanisms.
The Article is set out in three parts. Part I provides a short background
on the controversies over the Vienna Convention’s reservations provisions,
then discusses two appealing conjectures as to why they might disadvantage
non-reserving states: first, mistake, and second, a systematic bias by states
toward reservations. Part II then identifies how reservations may promote the
interests of non-reserving states, placing special emphasis on the informationenhancing and risk-shifting—or “reserving”—functions. Part III describes the
extent to which attempts at reform are consistent with those interests.

19. This requires bracketing other objections to reservations, though consent is often essential
to them as well. For example, appeals to treaty integrity rely on the treaty as negotiated, and so depend
on the consensual interest of non-reserving states. See, e.g., 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 36,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 205 (describing “[t]he principle of the integrity of the convention, which
subjects the admissibility of a reservation to the express or tacit assent of all the contracting parties”).
Even arguments that certain reservations are objectionable per se depend to a degree on state consent. If
human rights commitments must be understood in the context of local circumstances, the use of
reservations to promote local adaptation—and the allowance made for that at an international level—
should be acceptable in principle. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN R IGHTS 82-84, 88-93 (1998).
Indeed, the human rights that states are willing to recognize in a negotiated convention (and the number
of states that agree to promote them) are likely to be affected by the rules governing reservations, which
may make positive universalism a reality. See Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT 'L L. 643, 683-87 (1990)
(describing reservations to CEDAW as permitting compromise between universality of human rights
norms and their integrity); see infra Part II.B (discussing breadth and depth).
20. LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN HUMAN RIGHTS T REATIES 66 (1994)
(describing advantages accruing to reserving states).
21. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV . 2061 (2003).
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Several important, problematic assumptions are in order. First, I assume
for the most part that the relevant actors are rational, self-interested states,
though it should be recognized that one of the major functions of reservations
is to placate domestic constituencies.22 Second, I address reservations relating
to all kinds of multilateral conventions—economic, environmental, military,
human rights, and so forth—even though they pose somewhat distinct issues.
Third, in suggesting that the existing reservations regime has hidden virtues, I
certainly do not mean to suggest that it is optimal or in equilibrium. The
argument, instead, is that reservations reforms should pause before
undermining potentially attractive elements of the status quo, or consider how
potentially important values might be better fulfilled.
II.
A.

THE LAW OF RESERVATIONS

The Backdrop to the Vienna Convention

To understand the present regime, it is useful to consider the road not
taken. Prior to the Vienna Convention, the presumption was that all other
treaty parties would have to agree to any state’s proposed reservations.
Particular treaties might specify, however, that reservations were to be
accepted (or rejected) by the vote of a qualified majority of states, or that no
reservations were ever to be permitted. Under any of these approaches,
decision-making on reservations was consent-based, collective, and supposed
to determine a reservation’s status shortly after it was proposed. Under the
innovative and exceptional Pan American doctrine, 23 in contrast, proposed
reservations were effective against any state that had accepted them, but if a
state objected, no treaty relations would be forged between it and the
reserving state. This, too, was purely consensual in character, but no longer
collective; assuming a state did not withdraw a proposed reservation, it might
create three sets of bilateral relations—one between the reserving state and
accepting states (the treaty’s original terms, as altered by the reservation), a
second between all non-reserving states (the treaty’s original terms), and a
third for non-treaty relations between the reserving state and objecting
24
states.
The International Court of Justice developed a hybrid approach in its
Genocide Convention advisory opinion. The occasion was an accounting

22. See infra text accompanying notes 119, 126-128, 222 (noting role of domestic institutions
in reserving and reacting to other states’ reservations); see also infra text accompanying notes 180-183
(noting that reservations may reveal information about domestic politics).
23. So called after the former Pan American Union, now the Organization of American States.
See Co-Operation with Inter-American Bodies, Annex IV, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/102 (Apr. 12, 1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 236, 250-51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (Nov.
1956); see also Reservations, supra note 17, at 141-44 (describing “Pan-American” rule).
24. See generally INGRID DETTER, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF T REATIES (1967); FRANK HORN,
RESERVATIONS AND INTERPRETIVE DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL T REATIES (1988); ROSENNE,
supra note 4, at 356-57, 424-36; IAN SINCLAIR , THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, at
ch. 3 (2d ed. 1984); Rudolf L. Bindschedler, Treaties, Reservations (1984), in 4 ENYCLOPEDIA PUB .
INT ’L L. 965 (2000). Perhaps the best illustrations of the wide variety of pre-Vienna schemes are
provided in William W. Bishop, Jr., Reservations to Treaties, 103 R ECUEIL DES COURS 245 (II-1961).
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problem—namely, whether those reckoning when the Genocide Convention
came into force should count states that had ratified with objected-to
25
reservations —but the answer had lasting significance. The Court rejected
arguments that international law required that reservations be accepted
unanimously, noting the prevalence of reservations, tacit assent to them, and
26
the rarity of objections. Instead, everything depended on the treaty in
question, and the Court found it plausible that the Genocide Convention’s
drafters had intended to permit reservations, perhaps not mentioning the
possibility simply to avoid unduly encouraging them. 27 Not only was
universal participation (promoted, as necessary, by allowing reservations) of
utmost importance, but the nature of the treaty meant that reservations
imposed few costs on non-reserving states: in human rights treaties, “the
contracting States do not have any interests of their own,” but instead have
only the common interest of accomplishing “those high purposes which are
28
the raison d’être of the convention.”
To the Court, this common interest also suggested an objective basis for
evaluating reservations—whether they were consistent with the treaty’s object
and purpose—that “limit[ed] both the freedom of making reservations and that
of objecting to them.” 29 The Court acknowledged that states might have
30
differing opinions about compatibility, and this was the central complaint
made in a dissent by four judges. For the dissenters, international law required
a default rule of unanimous consent to reservations, 31 the clarity of which
would facilitate negotiating alternative rules better suited to particular
conventions. 32 The dissenters thought the majority’s approach would be
impossible to administer: a treaty’s “object and purpose” would rarely be
evident, and the difficulty of reconciling varying state appraisals would give
rise to “the utmost confusion.”33 This laid the groundwork for future criticisms
of the Vienna Convention regime.

25. ROSENNE , supra note 4, at 424-25.
26. Genocide Convention, supra note 3, 1951 I.C.J. at 21-25.
27. Id. at 22-23.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id. at 24.
30. Id. at 26. Two potential exceptions were noted: first, when states sought a more general
“jurisdictional” resolution of the matter on the common plane; second, when a state objected, but
without claiming that a reservation was incompatible, and “an understanding [developed] between that
State and the reserving State [to] the effect that the Convention will enter into force between them,
except for the clauses affected by the reservation.” Id. at 27.
31. Id. at 31 (dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, & Hsu Mo).
32. Id. at 37-42 (dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, & Hsu
Mo).
33. Id. at 42-46 (dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, & Hsu
Mo).
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The Vienna Convention and its Ambiguities

The Genocide Convention majority’s approach was accepted, at least
34
provisionally, for other treaties, but the International Law Commission
remained seized of the matter through the 1960s. It initially favored something
35
36
closer to the dissenters’ view, but evolved due to changes in personnel and
37
state preferences. The rule ultimately reflected in the Vienna Convention, in
any case, is that unless a treaty provides otherwise, reservations may be
38
proffered unless they are incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose.
If a state fails to object to a proposed reservation within twelve months, it is
39
deemed to have accepted it, and the reservation is effective in relations
40
between the reserving state and the non-objecting state. If a state does
object, it is presumed nonetheless to be accepting the reserving state as a
41
treaty party; in that case, the provisions to which the reservation relates are
deemed inapplicable in relations between the two states.42
This sketch, however, passes over some genuine ambiguities, including
many that are thought to disadvantage non-reserving states. Indeed, the sum of
the uncertainties afflicting them suggests, at least superficially, that the law of
reservations is badly in need of fixing.
1.

The Initial Standing of Reservations

As noted above, Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention provides that
states “may . . . formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation is
incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose.”43 It is unclear how, and
when, this incompatibility bar kicks in. If Article 19(c) really constrains a
state, even as it formulates a reservation, one natural reading is that
34. The General Assembly commended that approach to the Secretary General’s practice as
“depositary,” and to states in general. G.A. Res. 598(VI), at 84, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 360th plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/L.37 (Jan. 12, 1952).
35. 1951 ILC Report, supra note 4, ¶ 24, [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 128 (concluding that
“the criterion of the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a multilateral
convention . . . is not suitable for application to multilateral conventions in general”).
36. See, e.g., SINCLAIR , supra note 24, at 59 (attributing “fundamental change in the
Commission’s approach to reservations” to the appointment of a new special rapporteur in 1961).
37. See Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the Convention on
Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT ’L L. 281, 289 (1991) (reporting that “not one [delegation]
favored the unanimity rule governing the admission of reservations”). Compare 1951 ILC Report, supra
note 4, ¶ 34, [1951] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 130-31, with 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 152-53,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 321-22. States had also participated in the Genocide Convention
proceedings, but their participation in the Commission is somewhat more direct. UNITED NATIONS, THE
WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 21-22, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.6 (1996) (stressing that
“[g]overnments have an important role at every stage” of the Commission’s work).
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that the Vienna Convention rules on reservations, when
drafted, were the unmediated result of state preferences. The Commission’s preferences, and other
factors, undoubtedly played a significant role. See, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 4, at 427 (surmising that
the General Assembly was surprised by the results of its initial inquiry).
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 19(c).
39. Id. art. 20(5).
40. Id. art. 21(1)(a) & (b).
41. Id. art. 20(4)(b).
42. Id. art. 21(3).
43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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incompatible reservations are void ab initio. But this reading, sometimes
termed the “permissibility” approach to reservations, is not inevitable. The
drafting history suggests that the repeated references to “formulating”
reservations were intended to avoid suggesting that anything more definitive
was accomplished by lodging them alone; some ILC members would have
gone further, but their commentary suggests that the matter was unresolved, as
does debate within the conference. 45 In any event, the rule can hardly be
46
regarded as self-enforcing. The Vienna Convention sheds no light on how a
treaty’s “object and purpose” is to be reckoned, 47 nor does practice, 48 and
49
particular treaties often do not supply any clues. This makes it harder to
credit the suggestion that incompatible reservations are automatically void,
unless each reserving state is supposed to intuit the answer in its own cause.
Those championing what is called the “opposability” approach argue
that the Vienna Convention instead vests the other, non-reserving states with
50
the final authority on compatibility. If states accept the reservation, or fail to
object within the allotted time, this may reflect their considered judgment that
the reservation does not violate the treaty’s object and purpose, but it is in any
event decisive. This approach can be faulted for failing to take seriously the
limits imposed by Article 19(c) on the formulation of reservations—or, for
that matter, to respect incompatibility at all, given that (on the opposability
51
view) all objections, whatever their ground, have equal standing. Treating

44. Or, perhaps, not properly regarded as reservations at all. See, e.g., D.W. Bowett,
Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 67 (1976-77). Some
additional arguments are elaborated in the next section.
45. For reviews of this history, see, for example, Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Fifth
Report on Reservations to Treaties, Third Addendum, ¶¶ 227-28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/508/Add.3 (Jun. 23,
2000) (prepared by Alain Pellet).
46. See, e.g., Isabel Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The ‘Object and Purpose’ of a Treaty: An
Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT ’L & E UR. L. 311 (1998); Jan Klabbers, Some Problems Regarding the
Object and Purpose of Treaties, 8 FIN. Y.B. INT ’L L. 138 (1997).
47. As William Schabas observes, the interpretive approach commended by the Vienna
Convention indicates that a treaty’s object and purpose is to be determined in light of its object and
purpose. William A. Schabas, Reservations to Human Rights Treaties: Time for Innovation and Reform,
1994 C AN. Y.B. INT ’L L. 39, 48. The problems with using a treaty’s object and purpose as a threshold
test for reservations were evident from the beginning. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, at 44
(dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, & Hsu Mo) (“What is the ‘object and
purpose’ of the Genocide Convention? To repress genocide? Of course; but is it more than that? Does it
comprise any or all of the enforcement articles of the Convention? That is the heart of the matter.”).
48. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 81 (describing case law
of the International Court of Justice).
49. Schabas, supra note 47, at 47.
50. See 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 57, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 226 (noting
that admissibility inescapably depends on the judgment of other state parties); Ruda, supra note 1; see
also Bindschedler, supra note 24, at 965 (“If a reservation were to be incompatible with the object and
purpose of a treaty, but all the other contracting parties were to accept it notwithstanding, the reservation
probably would attain validity; in such circumstances another treaty with different aims would come into
being.”).
51. As noted previously, the Genocide Convention advisory opinion appeared to suggest that
the only basis for an objection was incompatibility. See infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. The
Commission adopted this approach in its 1962 proposals, but after several states protested that
objections were often made on other grounds, see 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 110, 118, 177,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 279, 287, 346 (comments by Australia, Denmark, and the United States),
it dropped that limitation. Most commentators, accordingly, think that objections may be made on any
ground, and with identical effect. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
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incompatible reservations as (merely) opposable also fits somewhat
awkwardly within the objections scheme: like reservations expressly or
52
implicitly precluded by the treaty’s terms (also mentioned in Article 19),
incompatible reservations may in theory be evaluated without any intervention
by a non-reserving state, and do not seem appropriately made part of a treaty
53
through sheer inaction.
Neither permissibility nor opposability is obviously correct, 54 and
practice has not conclusively resolved the matter. States sometimes act as
though allegedly incompatible treaty reservations were never good, or indicate
55
that they regard objecting to such reservations as strictly unnecessary. Treaty
monitoring bodies, too, have increasingly asserted the right to re-evaluate the
compatibility of treaty reservations. 56 Neither pattern is consistent with the
view that incompatibility becomes a non-issue if states have failed to object.
THE UNITED

STATES § 313, cmt. c (1987); AUST, supra note 1, at 127; SINCLAIR, supra note 24, at 61;
Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity? Some Reflections on Reservations to General
Multilateral Treaties, 1993 BRIT. Y.B. INT ’L L. 245, 251, 255 & n.52. But cf. Schabas, supra note 47, at
63-64 (“[A] state could not arbitrarily object to a reservation formulated by a ratifying state, but must
base its objection on the breach of the ‘object and purpose’ test or of some other rule.”).
52. See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 19(a)-(c).
53. The ILC’s Special Rapporteur makes this case quite forcefully. See Special Rapporteur,
Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶¶ 183-87.
54. For what it is worth, it is even unclear which view more commentary favors. Compare
LIJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 41-43 (“The majority of writers conclude that, though compatibility is an
objective criterion, it will ultimately be the States parties who will decide upon the acceptability of a
given reservation.”), with Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State
Consent, 96 AM . J. INT' L L. 531, 534 n.21 (2002) (representing that “[t]he majority view among legal
scholars is that, under the modern system, individual states cannot ‘accept’ state R’s incompatible
reservation, unless all state parties consent to such a fundamental change”); cf. Special Rapporteur, Int’l
Law Comm’n, First Report on the Law and Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties, ¶¶ 96-115,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/470 (May 30, 1995) (prepared by Alain Pellet) (describing division of opinion
between permissibility and opposability schools, and taking position that the Commission could not
resolve the debate at that juncture) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, First Report]; Konstantin Korkelia,
New Challenges to the Regime of Reservations Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 437, 452-54 (2002) (describing debate); Redgwell, supra note 51, at 263-69
(same).
There are, of course, other permutations of those approaches. For example, while the Vienna
Convention creates a default presumption that reservations will modify treaty relations between the
reserving state and non-reserving states, an incompatible reservation might plausibly—irrespective of
objection—void that default, without necessarily preventing the reserving state from becoming a party to
the treaty.
55. See, e.g., Observations by the United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 INT 'L HUM.
RTS. REP. 261, 264 (1996) [hereinafter U.K. Observations] (reporting U.K. view that incompatible
reservations fall outside the scope of Articles 20 and 21 entirely); Statement by Ambassador Carl Henrik
Ehrenkrona, Legal Advisor of the Foreign Ministry of Sweden, on Behalf of the Nordic Countries for
the Report, Oct. 30, 2003, http://www.swedenabroad.com/pages/general.asp?id=13328&expand=11049
(last visited Apr. 29, 2006) (reporting similar view of Nordic states); Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Fifth Session: Topical Summary of the
Discussion held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its Fifty-Eighth Session, ¶¶ 178,
188, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/537 (Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Topical Summary 2004].
Sometimes the permissibility view is viewed as a constraint by reserving states too. In one
instance, for example, the Office of the Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State defended the
proposition that a very substantial reservation to a treaty (exempting nuclear warships from the
definition of the “nuclear ships” covered by the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators
of Nuclear Ships) might be proposed by the United States, subject to objection by other states, “unless it
is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.” The Law of Treaties and Other International
Agreements, 1975 DIGEST § 1, at 263-64 (quoting memorandum).
56. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, the fact remains that states do object to reservations on
incompatibility grounds, though that is unnecessary under the permissibility
57
approach. Treaty bodies, while occasionally despairing that states can be
entrusted to enforce a compatibility standard, 58 have made no headway in
59
developing an objective test for the object and purpose of a treaty. The result
is confusion as to whether reservations, once proffered, are any good, and
what a non-reserving state has to do about that.
2.

The Form and Timing of Objections

Once a state has tendered a reservation, Article 20 of the Vienna
Convention indicates that non-reserving states may accept the reservation or
object to it—no other options are specified. An objection is presumed not to
preclude the treaty’s entry into force unless the objecting state says so
60
clearly; all objections, it would appear, must be tendered within twelve
months, or a state will be deemed to have accepted the reservation.61
For reasons already suggested, the problem of incompatible reservations
62
makes this less clear. If incompatible reservations are void ab initio, such
that no objection is necessary at all, the mere failure to act within twelve
63
months cannot be construed as tacit acceptance. If, on the other hand,

57. This may simply be risk aversion: even if a state believes that it would be within its rights
to invoke incompatibility in some future dispute without having first objected, it may not wish
unnecessarily to rely on that position. Objecting may also provide collateral benefits, such as
encouraging other states to object or encouraging the reserving state to withdraw its reservation. See
infra notes 273, 286-290 and accompanying text.
58. General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶¶ 17, 18.
59. The experience of the Human Rights Committee is illustrative. Its description of the object
and purpose of the ICCPR was strikingly capacious. General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶ 7. While it
suggested that reservations contrary to peremptory norms or customary international law are necessarily
incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose, id. ¶ 8, one may distinguish between reservations to the
underlying norm and reservations as to treaty-based means of enforcing that norm, see Observations by
the United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT 'L HUM. RTS. REP. 265, 267 (1996) [hereinafter U.S.
Observations], and there is in any event no greater consensus as to the norms on which such a test relies.
See Schabas, supra note 47, at 49-54. For discussion of the ILC Special Rapporteur’s somewhat
different resolution, see infra text accompanying notes 237 (noting attempt to provide general definition
of object and purpose), 256-260 (describing approach to compatibility of reservations relating to
peremptory norms and customary international law).
60. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(4)(b).
61. Id. art. 20(5). The International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial
Discrimination is one example of a treaty establishing a different deadline—a mere ninety days, which
probably serves to diminish still further the prevalence of objections. International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) art. 20(1), opened for signature March 7,
1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; see also Yogesh Tyagi, The Conflict of Law and
Policy on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 71 BRIT. Y.B. INT ’L L. 181, 220-21 (2000)
(describing the process by which the CERD Committee “attempted to check [reservations]”).
62. See Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Eighth Report on Reservations to Treaties, ¶
73, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/535 (May 23, 2003) (prepared by Alain Pellet) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur,
Eighth Report] (concluding that “Article 20, paragraph 5 gives ambiguous indications as to the period in
which an objection may be formulated”).
63. See, e.g., Hampson Report, supra note 13, ¶ 19.
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incompatible reservations fall entirely within the general legal scheme, as the
opposability school suggests, that argument is not well taken.64
The uncertainty surrounding these questions seems to have affected state
practice. States usually object (if at all) on a timely basis. 65 But states not
infrequently object more than twelve months after receiving notice of a
66
reservation, when on an opposability approach such acts are legally void.
Such tardiness may be due to a state’s miscalculation as to when it received
67
68
notice of the reservation, or inattentiveness, but the problem seems more
pervasive than that.69 In some instances, states have expressly justified tardy
objections on the grounds that incompatible reservations are not governed by
70
the time limits imposed by Article 20.

64. See AUST, supra note 1, at 117 (noting argument); 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 38,
[1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 207 (indicating that the former Article 16(c) must “be read in close
conjunction with the provisions . . . regarding acceptance of and objection to reservations”).
65. Reactions to Pakistan’s reservation to the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, which affected its use, storage, and transportation of nuclear material, certainly
illustrate sensitivity. See Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Information Circular: Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material: Status List as of 30 September 2002, IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/274/Rev.1/Add.8 (Nov. 5, 2002). Fifteen of the seventeen states or organizations objecting
did so within a year after Pakistan’s submission of its instruments of ratification; Euratom, via the
European Union, appears to have gone to some trouble in order to be timely. Hughes Belin, EU,
Euratom Object to Pakistan’s Reserve on Physical Protection Text, NUCLEAR FUEL, Oct. 29, 2001, at
12.
66. See HORN, supra note 24, at 205-09. Under a permissibility approach, on the other hand,
dilatory objections (like timely objections) need never be made at all, at least when the reservation is
incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose. See supra text accompanying note 44.
67. The twelve-month period commences when the non-reserving state is “notified of the
reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is
later.” Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 20(5). For general discussions of timing niceties, see
HORN, supra note 24, at 205-09; L IJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 147-48; Lawrence J. LeBlanc,
Reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 4
INT ’L J. CHILD . R TS. 357, 378-79 (1996).
68. For suggestions that reservations are often overlooked, even by competent ministries, see
AUST, supra note 1, at 115; SINCLAIR , supra note 24, at 63; Daniel L. Hylton, Note, Default Breakdown:
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Inadequate Framework on Reservations, 27 VAND . J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 439 (1994).
69. See LIJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 147-48 (addressing Convention on Racial
Discrimination); id. at 222-24 (ICCPR); id. at 382 (Convention Against Torture); LeBlanc, supra note
67, at 378-79. Even conspicuous reservations may attract late objections. For example, while a number
of states objected to the U.S. reservations to the ICCPR, apparently none did so within twelve months.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 399, 434-35 (2000); Catherine J. Redgwell, Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights
Committee General Comment No. 24(52), 46 INT’ L & COMP . L.Q. 390, 394-95 (1997).
70. See 1 MULTILATERAL T REATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: STATUS AS
OF 31 D ECEMBER 2003, at 215, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/22, U.N. Sales No. E.04.v.2 (2004)
[hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (Italian communication regarding Botswana reservation to the
ICCPR); id. at 243 (Danish communication regarding Niger reservation to CEDAW); id. at 262 (Danish
communication to Kuwait reservation to CEDAW); id. at 265 (Swedish communication regarding
Singapore reservation to CEDAW); id. at 288 (Italian and Danish communications regarding Qatar
reservation to Torture Convention); id. at 306 (objection by Denmark to the reservations of Brunei and
Saudi Arabia to the Convention on the Rights of the Child); id. at 312 (Danish communications
regarding reservations by Djibouti, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child); id. at 313 (Belgian and Danish communications regarding Malaysia reservation to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child); id. at 314 (Belgian communication regarding Qatar reservation
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child). As these examples reflect, this position has been taken
exclusively, or nearly so, with regard to human rights conventions, perhaps because reservations to those
conventions are often both far-reaching and the subject of less careful (and timely) scrutiny by other
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Timing is also affected by lacunae having less to do with
incompatibility. For example, states do not always make clear whether their
71
response is an objection, arguably tolling the period for objection—
particularly if it may be argued that the underlying reservation is impossible to
72
assess as of the time it was notified. Finally, the practical consequences of
tardiness may be insubstantial. It is notable, for example, that the U.N.
Secretary-General accepts for deposit late objections—conceding only some
“indicative value” by calling a late objection a “communication” when
circulating it.73
These practices reinforce uncertainty as to whether the twelve-month
limit “expresses a criterion for the validity of an objection” or “establishes no
more than a presumption of acceptance.” 74 The case seems strongest for
exempting objections on incompatibility grounds from any strict deadline, or
at least subjecting those that are late to some lesser sanction.75 Whatever the
merits of these arguments, the overlapping excuses for late objections make it
unclear what rule states are forging—or violating—and suggest that the scope
of the tacit acceptance rule will remain murky.
3.

The Effect of Objections

Under Article 21, if a non-reserving state accepts another state’s
76
reservation, it modifies the relevant treaty provisions for them both. If, on
the other hand, a non-reserving state objects—without specifically denying the
reserving party’s status as a party—“the provisions to which the reservation
relates do not apply as between the two States to the extent of the
reservation.”77
states. But the accompanying statements have not purported to limit the argument to that context, and
the logic applies to other types of conventions as well.
71. See Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Eighth Report on Reservations to Treaties,
First Addendum, ¶¶ 86-92, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/535/Add.1 (July 10, 2003) (prepared by Alain Pellet)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add.] (describing examples of queries and other
“quasi-objections”); LIJNZAAD , supra note 20, at 225 (describing advent of the “pseudo-objection” under
the ICCPR).
72. See AUST, supra note 1, at 121 (citing equivocal statement by the United Kingdom that it
was not “able to take a position on” four reservations made by the Korea to the ICCPR “in the absence
of a sufficient indication of their intended effect,” and so would reserve its rights, and concluding that
“[t]he effect of this statement is to suspend the time limit there may be for making objections, whatever
that might be, until the reserving state has made clear the effect of the reservation”); Redgwell, supra
note 69, at 397-401.
73. Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the SecretaryGeneral as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, ¶ 213, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter
Summary of Practice]. The Treaty Section distinguishes objections from non-parties; although these are
also dubbed “communications,” they are not ordinarily registered or published. Id. ¶ 214.
74. HORN, supra note 24, at 208-09. Horn’s argument cites state practice, but also adverts to
the drafting history, functional considerations, the language of other conventions, and the fact that
Article 20(5) states only that “a reservation is considered to have been accepted” when no objection has
been made within a year—language that, without more, seems perfectly sufficient to refer to a deemed,
but conclusive, acceptance.
75. This solution requires a rather nuanced view of the relationship among Articles 19 through
21, but it is not out of the question. One might say, for example, that Article 21 requires that a
reservation be “established” in accordance with Articles 19 and 20, and that incompatible reservations
by definition are not. Cf. AUST, supra note 1, at 117-18.
76. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 21(1)(a), (b).
77. Id. art. 21(3).
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Applying this provision gives rise to mundane questions, such as
determining the provisions to which the reservations relate, and predictably
78
runs into problems when it comes to incompatible reservations. But the
principal puzzle concerns the value added by objecting to any reservation,
since disapplying the relevant treaty provisions seems little better than
79
accepting the reservation’s modification of them. The problem is evident, for
example, when states enter reservations to compulsory dispute settlement
mechanisms: regardless of whether a non-reserving state objects, the reserving
state will benefit from the reservation, since there is no practical difference
80
between accepting the reservation and disapplying the provision entirely.
The result, as one official put it, is that any objection not denying treaty
relations altogether may be “only for the record,” 81 leaving states little
incentive to object—which means that states also have reason to refrain from
formulating reservations in the first place.
Two developments compound the Vienna Convention’s uncertainties.
82
First, some states—principally Nordic —claim innovative effects for their
objections, at least when a reservation may be said to be incompatible with a
treaty’s object and purpose. Some objections assert what has been termed an
“intermediate” effect, disapplying not only the reserved-to provisions but also
83
other provisions identified by the objecting state. Another, more common,

78. It is hard to accept that an incompatible reservation has a conventional effect on treaty
relations between the reserving and accepting state, as if there were nothing distinctive about it. (If, for
example, a state party to the Genocide Convention were to include a reservation affording it discretion
to commit genocide, it is hard to believe that such a term would modify the treaty’s terms inter se even
if another state remained mum.) Similarly, it would appear inappropriate to require objecting states to
preclude explicitly entry into force of incompatible reservations. LIJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 45 (citing
authorities espousing this view).
79. As Elena Baylis commented, “[t]his does not seem like a satisfactory, or even rational,
result.” Elena Baylis, General Comment 24: Confronting the Problem of Reservations to Human Rights
Treaties, 17 BERKELEY J. INT ’L L. 277, 294 (1999); see LIJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 48; SINCLAIR, supra
note 24, at 76-77; Ruda, supra note 1, at 200. There are other ways of conceptualizing the differences,
but they do not lead to any difference in outcome. See, e.g., HORN, supra note 24, at 176 (distinguishing
between the “regulation” envisioned by a treaty, the “contraregulation” created by acceptance of a
reservation, and the “deregulation” created by an objection).
80. HORN, supra note 24, at 177.
81. The Law of Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1980 DIGEST § 1, at 397
(quoting letter from Arthur W. Rovine, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs); see also P.H.
Imbert, Reservations and Human Rights Conventions, 6 HUM . RTS. REV . 28, 29 (1981) (claiming that
the tension relating to reservations to human rights treaties is “aggravated by the fact that when one
Contracting Party makes a reservations there seems to be nothing that the other parties can do about it”).
But see Reservations, supra note 17, at 139 (quoting congressional testimony of State Department Legal
Advisor Hackworth, in response to query, that “[i]t is safe [in adopting reservations] to go just as far as
you feel like going, but if you want to be sure to become a party to the instrument, you would have to
move with considerable caution lest the other parties should refuse to accept the reservations”).
82. See Klabbers, supra note 16; Lars Magnuson, Elements of Nordic Practice 1997: The
Nordic Countries in Coordination, 67 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 345, 350 (1998). But the phenomenon is not
limited to those countries. Hampson Report, supra note 13, ¶¶ 16-17 (citing examples); Special
Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Ninth Report on Reservations to Treaties, ¶ 19 n.38, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/544 (June 24, 2004) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report] (same).
83. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its FiftySixth Session, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/10 (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 ILC Report]; Special
Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 95; see, e.g., 2 MULTILATERAL T REATIES, supra
note 70, at 330-35 (statements by Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States to the effect that they are not in treaty relations with respect to provisions of the Vienna
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type seeks “super maximum” effect by asserting a binding relationship
between the states under the entire treaty, including any provisions to which
84
the reservations pertain.
The main argument for such innovations,
unsurprisingly, is that objections premised on a reservation’s impermissibility
are not governed by Article 21 at all, and that it would be intolerable to limit
85
responses to such reservations to the minimal effects of ordinary objections.
Expanding the range of possible effects can make determining a state’s treaty
86
obligations considerably more challenging.
A second development has been intervention by treaty-monitoring
bodies. While some bodies have disclaimed any authority to judge
87
reservations under the governing treaties, others have concluded the

Convention on the Law of Treaties subject to dispute settlement provisions, to which other states had
reserved, in respect of those states).
84. 2005 ILC Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 18, 29; 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 17; Special
Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82, ¶ 8; Special Rapporteur, Eight Report, First Add., supra note
71, ¶ 96 (citing examples). For example, Sweden’s objection to Qatar’s reservation to the Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and
Child Pornography stated that “[t]he Convention enters into force in its entirety between the two States,
without Qatar benefiting from its reservation.” 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES , supra note 70, at 333; see
also id. at 244-47, 256-58, 259-65 (objections and communications by Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and
Great Britain to CEDAW reservations); id. at 306, 307, 309-13 (objections and communications by
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden to reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child); id. at 18283, 186 (objection by Denmark, Finland, and Sweden to ICCPR reservations). This type of objection is
not entirely limited to human rights treaties. See, e.g., 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 111
(objection by Finland to reservations to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Päivi
Kaukoranta, Elements of Nordic Practice 1997: Finland, 67 NORDIC J. INT ’L L. 321, 327-28 (1998); id.
at 433 (objection by Finland to reservations to the Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances).
85. See, e.g., Topical Summary 2004, supra note 55, ¶ 178. The Netherlands also once
reasoned that the authority to object to any treaty relations with the reserving state connoted the right to
exclude only part of a treaty, providing the provisions were severable. R.C.R. Siekmann, Netherlands
State Practice for the Parliamentary Year 1982-1983, 15 NETH . Y.B. INT’L L. 267, 345-46 (1984)
(quoting explanatory memorandum from the Dutch government concerning the ratification of the
Vienna Convention). Subsequent defenses have sounded in permissibility terms. See, e.g., Lars
Magnuson, Elements of Nordic Practice 1997: The Nordic Countries in Coordination, 67 NORDIC J.
INT ’L L. 345, 350 (1998) (quoting statement by Swedish representative to the Sixth Committee of the
U.N. General Assembly); Laurids Mikaelsen, Elements of Nordic and International Practice in the Year
of 1996 (Denmark), 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 319, 323 (1997). States defending innovative objections have,
in any event, confined their use to reservations they assert to be inadmissible. See supra note 83 (citing
examples).
86. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 1, at 112, 119 (citing varied reactions to Guatemalan
reservation to the Vienna Convention itself); 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 330-33, 33637 (objections of, e.g., Denmark, Finland, Belgium, and the United Kingdom) (reflecting fact that some
objections were arguably dilatory as well); 1 id. at 286-88 (reporting varied claimed effects in the
objections to the now-withdrawn Chilean reservation to the Torture Convention regarding superior
orders).
87. See Memorandum from the Office of Legal Affairs to the Director of the Division of
Human Rights Regarding Legal Effects of Statements of Interpretation and Other Declarations Made at
the Time of Ratification or Accession (Apr. 5, 1976), reprinted in Selected Legal Opinions of the
Secretariats of the United Nations and Related Intergovernmental Organizations, 1976 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
159, 219-21, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/14 (reporting view by the Office of Legal Affairs that a
decision by CERD “that a reservation already accepted is incompatible with the object and purposes of
the Convention would have no legal effect”); Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/33/18 (1978); Legal Opinion of the Treaty Section of the Office of
Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat Upon an Inquiry by the Committee Concerning the
Implementation of Article 28 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, in Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, at
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opposite, with little more by way of an explicit entitlement. The primary
driver seems to be the perceived need to correct the Vienna Convention
regime. The Human Rights Committee, for example, argued the nonreciprocal character of human rights treaties meant that states were inadequate
guardians against reservations, and that it needed to know whether
89
reservations were in effect in order to fulfill its own functions.
The authority of treaty bodies with respect to reservations has been
90
resisted by a number of states, but for immediate purposes, it suffices to
highlight two ways in which it accentuates, rather than resolves, the Vienna
Convention’s ambiguities. First, the suggestion that states are inadequate calls
into question a premise more or less common to the permissibility and
opposability approaches—the acceptance that state appraisals, through
objections or otherwise, govern the acceptance of reservations—and creates
doubt as to whether the Vienna Convention is a complete regulatory system.
The second source of confusion concerns the remedy for incompatible
reservations. The Human Rights Committee announced that incompatible
reservations may be severed, so that the treaty binds the reserving party in its
91
92
entirety.
Whatever this position’s merits,
the Committee’s lack of
specificity as to when a reservation will be deemed severable, 93 and its
55-56, U.N. Doc. A/39/45 (1984). In each case, though, the relevant body has nonetheless interrogated
states regarding their reservations. Tyagi, supra note 61, at 221, 230-31.
88. See, e.g., Belilos v. Switz., 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988), reprinted in 10 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 466 (1988); Chris Wold, Implementation of Reservations Law in International Environmental
Treaties: The Case of Cuba and Iceland, 14 COLO. J. INT ’L ENVTL. L. & POL’ Y 53, 73-77 (2003)
(discussing the International Whaling Commission).
89. General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶¶ 17-18.
90. Cf. Korkelia, supra note 54, at 437-38 (noting controversies). For objections by states, see
infra note 92 (citing state objections).
91. General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶ 18. The Committee is hardly alone in its view. The
Secretary-General, Report of the Ninth Meeting of Persons Chairing the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶
18, U.N. Doc. A/53/125 (Annex) (May 14, 1998) (reporting chairpersons’ “firm support for the
approach reflected in General Comment No. 24”); Belilos, 10 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 487 (endorsing
severability); Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995) (same).
92. For criticisms, see generally Evans v. Trin. & Tobago, Communication No. 908/2000,
Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000 (Wedgwood, dissenting); Observations by France on
General Comment 24, 4 INT 'L HUM. RTS. REP. 8 (1997) [hereinafter France Observations]; U.K.
Observations, supra note 55, at 261; U.S. Observations, supra note 59, at 265; Roberto Baratta, Should
Invalid Reservations to Human Rights Treaties Be Disregarded?, 11 E UR. J. INT ’L L. 413 (2000); and
William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is
the United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT 'L L. 277, 324-325 (1995).
93. The Committee said only that the “normal” result was severance. General Comment 24,
supra note 6, ¶ 18. It has not in fact appeared especially eager to judge the permissibility or severability
of state reservations; it took a more deferential approach, for example, in considering the state report
submitted by the United States. See, e.g., Report of the Human Rights Committee, United States of
America, ¶¶ 279, 292, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995) (citing reservations the Committee “believes to
be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant,” and urging that the United States review
them with a view to withdrawing them). When it took a more aggressive position in connection with an
individual communication concerning Trinidad and Tobago, that state denounced the ICCPR Optional
Protocol. See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the
Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV . 1832, 1881
(2002) (describing episode). Since then, the Committee’s practice with respect to individual
communications has been “to confine the effect of reservations narrowly, but not to question their
fundamental permissibility,” or to honor the invocation of reservations but address claims indirectly
through the use of non-reserved provisions. Seventeenth Meeting of Chairpersons of the Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, The Practice of Human Rights Treaty Bodies with Respect to Reservations to
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ambiguity concerning a treaty body’s final authority in any such
determination, 94 are striking. Given that states have not generally asserted
severability powers for themselves, the Committee’s view either sharpens the
divide between the risks a state takes when facing intervention by a third
party, as opposed to review by its peers, or it supports expanding the claims of
some states to lodge innovative objections with equivalent effects.
*****
Many of these issues are appreciated by those interested in reforming the
Convention regime. The International Law Commission has thus far rejected
claims that the regime needs an overhaul, but it concurs that the system’s
95
uncertainties interfere with its effective operation, and that supplemental
guidelines are necessary to resolve ambiguities and restore order. 96 Before
adopting even so modest a course, it would be useful to examine how this may
have developed—to undertake, that is, a positive analysis of reservations law
seriously, rather than simply regarding it as a mess to be reformed. To do so,
we first need a better understanding of state interests in reservations.
III.

A POSITIVE ACCOUNT OF RESERVATIONS

For the reasons described, the Vienna Convention appears vague on the
most essential questions, and its ambiguities are thought to be particularly
nettlesome for those confronted with a reservation—partly because the rules
already seem to favor the reserving states, and partly because they benefit
from any resulting limbo. While states must take seriously their treaty
obligations, the international legal system is ill-situated to enforce obligations
against states that have conditioned those obligations, at least when their
expressed wishes appear unopposed by other states, organizations, or doctrine.
This poses the puzzle, however, as to why states would favor one facet
of their identities. States are not, clearly, locked into reserving or nonreserving roles; a state proposing a reservation is no less likely to be
International Human Rights Treaties, ¶¶ 25, 28, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2005/5 (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter
Treaty Bodies’ Practice].
94. The Committee could be read to have asserted binding authority on the predicate
determination of compatibility. General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶ 11 (asserting non-contravenable
“competence to interpret the requirements of any provisions of the Covenant”); id. ¶ 18 (“It necessarily
falls to the Committee to determine whether a specific reservation is compatible with the object and
purpose of the Covenant.”). But the United States, among others, categorically rejected the Committee’s
power to issue “definitive or binding interpretations of the Covenant.” U.S. Observations, supra note 59,
at 266; see also U.K. Observations, supra note 55, at 263-64, ¶¶ 9-12 (submitting similar criticism);
France Observations, supra note 92, at 8 (same). Defenders of the Committee regarded the U.S.
objections as overstated, without clarifying its precise role. P.R. GHANDHI, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE AND THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATION 371 (1998) (suggesting a
“misunderstanding,” because “clearly the Committee is not seeking to arrogate a legally binding quality
to its views,” but defending its right to issue authoritative interpretations).
95. Special Rapporteur, First Report, supra note 54, ¶¶ 94-95.
96. See, e.g., 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 288 (reporting view that “the provisions of
the Vienna Conventions concerning objections were vague and needed to be clarified”); 1997 ILC
Report, supra note 8, ¶¶ 100-23 (setting out wide-ranging discussion of ambiguities and gaps in the
Vienna Convention).

324

THE YALE J OURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31: 307

evaluating other states’ reservations even to the very same treaty. So why
would they so decisively favor one role over the other? Perhaps the benefits of
reserving are still underappreciated, but we would also profit from a broader
appreciation of what inures to the advantage of non-reserving states—in short,
a sense of their interests.
A.

The Puzzle of Ambiguity: Two Conjectures

The existing literature has done little to unpack the interests of nonreserving states, let alone anything that could account for the existing
regime. 97 Nonetheless, two possible explanations for the existing state of
affairs may be surmised, each of which assumes something about the stake of
non-reservers.
1.

Mistake

One conjecture, reflected in a recent article by Ryan Goodman, is that
the “interest [of non-reserving states] consists in preserving the bargained-for
elements of a multilateral agreement, which incompatible reservations or
98
similar arrangements would defeat.” On this premise, “the almost universal
failure of states to object to reservations”—which one commentator described
as “the basic reason for the juristic bewilderment that has confounded this
subject”99—seems due to their carelessness in practice or, more plausibly, in
their having created insufficient incentives to object in the first place. Either
way, states tend to forgive reservations that they would not, and should not,
were the rules better designed.
This understanding of state interests, and diagnosis, is implicit in much
contemporary criticism of the Vienna Convention. Nevertheless, it appears
incomplete. Non-reserving states do not exploit some of the opportunities
already afforded them under the Convention. For example, they could specify
a treaty’s object and purpose, the better to deter incompatible reservations and
100
facilitate objection, or object more often to the party status of reserving
states. 101 Moreover, states might negotiate around the Convention by

97. If anything, existing accounts of the interests of non-reserving states tend to reinforce the
notion that the Vienna Convention is biased against them. See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, The
Hidden Bias of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (George Mason Univ. Law and Econ.
Working Paper No. 03-20); Francesco Parisi & Catherine Ševčenko, Treaty Reservations and the
Economics of Article 21(1) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2003); see also infra
text accompanying notes 206-209 (discussing absence of reciprocity). Ryan Goodman’s work, on the
other hand, has tried to explain how the interests of reserving states might be reconciled to recent
apparent inroads into their prerogatives. See Goodman, supra note 54.
98. Goodman, supra note 54, at 533.
99. D.P. O’CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL L AW 235 (2nd ed. 1970); accord LeBlanc, supra note
67, at 373-74 (discussing example of the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
100. It may be impossible, however, to identify the object and purpose of a treaty like the
LOSC, which features 320 articles and nine annexes, or even broad-ranging human rights treaties like
the ICCPR. AUST, supra note 1, at 111. The result of protracted negotiations might be the “verbatim
repetition of almost every provision.” Bernard Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AM . J. INT ’L L. 1, 35 (1980).
101. See AUST, supra note 1, at 115 (citing example).
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identifying provisions as to which reservations are permissible (if any),
specifying optional clauses that states are free to accept or reject,103 or creating
other mechanisms that allow states a (constrained) choice as to their levels of
obligation.104 Such workarounds are not explored at the rate one would expect
105
if states were intent on protecting negotiated treaty terms, and their form is
often even more disappointing. When states actually vary from the Vienna
Convention default, 106 they usually leave themselves free to lodge
107
108
declarations or other means of differentiating treaty obligations. In short,

102. See, e.g., Diplomatic Conference on Arrest of Ships, Mar. 1-12, 1999, Report of the U.N.
Int’l Mar. Org., art. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1888 (Mar. 19, 1999) (identifying provisions as to which
reservations are permitted); Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 64, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160
U.N.T.S. 231 (identifying provisions as to which reservations are permitted, but barring other
reservations). Recent examples of treaties barring any reservations include the World Health
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 30, May 21, 2003, WHA Res. 56.1
[hereinafter Tobacco Convention]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 120, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Such provisions appear to be particularly prevalent
in environmental agreements. See U.N. Off. of Leg. Affairs, Treaty Section, Final Clauses of
Multilateral Treaties, at 47 n.51, U.N. Doc. No. E.04.V.3 (2003) (citing examples). But see Craig L.
Carr & Gary L. Scott, Multilateral Treaties and the Environment: A Case Study in the Formation of
Customary International Law, 27 DENV. J. INT ’L L. & POL ’Y 313, 322 n.29 (1999) (indicating that only
ten of forty-one global environmental treaties surveyed contained “no reservations” provisions).
103. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Fifty-Second Session, at 241-47, U.N. Doc. A/55/10 (2000) (describing such provisions, but
distinguishing them from reservations).
104. Id. at 247-52 (describing provisions allowing state choice, but distinguishing them from
reservations); id. at 255-69 (describing other techniques for restricting the application of treaty terms);
Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Fifth Report on Reservations to Treaties, First Addendum, ¶¶
83-84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/508/Add.1 (May 1, 2000) (prepared by Alain Pellet) (enumerating
alternatives to reservations).
105. Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Second Report on Reservations to Treaties, First
Addendum ¶¶ 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/477/Add.1 (June 13, 1996) (prepared by Alain Pellet)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur, Second Report, First Add.] (citing rarity of provisions banning
reservations); AUST, supra note 1, at 124 (“The problems of reservations may be lessened, or even
avoided, if provision is made in each new treaty, but this is not new.”); Clark, supra note 37, at 282
(citing failure to meet “the ‘imperative necessity’ of formulating regimes on reservations specific to each
treaty”) (quoting ARNOLD MC NAIR , THE LAW OF TREATIES 170 (1961)); see, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins,
Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B INT ’L L. 281, 317-19 (1976-77) (describing
inconclusive negotiation of reservations clause to ICCPR); Gregory F. Jacob, Without Reservation, 5
CHI. J. INT ’L L. 287, 290 (2004) (claiming that before negotiating on the Tobacco Convention, “[m]any
of the delegates had never heard of a ‘no reservations’ clause”).
This was anticipated during the negotiation of the Vienna Convention. As Sinclair, a treaty law
expert from the United Kingdom, observed, “Although the ideal solution to the problem of reservations
was to ensure that the treaty itself dealt with the question, practical experience showed that, more often
than not, the treaty was silent on the matter, not necessarily because the negotiating States had ignored
the question of reservations, but usually because they had been unable to reach an agreed solution. . . .
As a result the negotiating States might reluctantly decide to dispense with a reservations article, so as
not to disturb the delicate balance of interests they had reached in formulating the treaty.” United
Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26-May 24, 1968, at
114, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1971).
106. Not infrequently, treaty-specific reservations clauses consist of insignificant variations on
the Vienna Convention, sometimes simply recapitulating the object and purpose test. See, e.g., Treaty
Bodies’ Practice, supra note 93, ¶ 5 (summarizing reservations terms in major human rights treaties).
107. Declarations are statements that in theory do not alter a state’s treaty obligations, but
which in fact are often pursued to that very effect. See infra text accompanying notes 148, 151
(discussing declarations, including examples of the Law of the Sea Convention and the International
Criminal Court).
108. Treaties that bar reservations to the principal articles often permit reservations to the
technical appendices or annexes—which may be where the real bite is felt. See, e.g., Comprehensive
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states do not appear moved to redress any mistakes they made in initially
assigning an advantage to reservations.
Most broadly, it would remain puzzling how this system came to pass.
The Genocide Convention advisory opinion alerted states to the basic contours
of the flexible system, yet they adopted something very much like it in the
Vienna Convention (and re-adopted near-identical terms in a subsequent
convention),109 and abide by these terms even when they need not.110 Their
embrace of what is, supposedly, such a one-sided bargain is at least counterintuitive, as is the vagueness of the rules they have elected to follow. As one
commentator noted, “One would expect the law regarding the States bound by
a treaty and the provisions of the treaty to which they are bound to be of such
a fundamental importance that the law regarding reservations would be clear
111
and stable. This has not, however, been the case.”
2.

Irrelevance—or Collusion

If this first conjecture is less than completely convincing, a second
commends itself: states really do not care much about reservations, or care
only about their own. The former account suggests that reservations are
112
infrequent and incidental to the effectiveness of treaties.
While the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art. XV, Sept. 24, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28, 35 I.L.M. 1439 (not in
force) (barring reservations to the treaty’s articles and annexes, but permitting reservations to the
protocol and its annexes if not incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction art. XXII, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317 (barring
reservations to the Convention’s articles, but permitting reservations to its annexes not incompatible
with its object and purpose). This is a particularly common practice in environmental treaties. See, e.g.,
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora art. XXIII, opened
for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES]; Andrew J. Hiemert,
Note, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 1473, 1477 (1995) (describing how reservations
and opt-out provisions in CITES permit states to permit “laundering” of endangered species); infra note
177 and accompanying text (discussing CITES).
Sometimes particular deals are struck with acceding parties. For example, while the Kyoto
Protocol prohibited reservations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 26, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32, concessions made to Japan, Canada, Australia, and
Russia reduced their emissions targets by two-thirds relative to the original 1997 terms. Compare id.,
with Eric Pianin, Emissions Treaty Softens Kyoto Targets, W ASH. POST, July 29, 2001, at A23 (citing
World Wildlife Fund estimates). See also infra text accompanying note 151 (discussing “package
deals”).
109. See supra note 2 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and
International Organizations or Between International Organizations and Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties).
110. See supra note 6.
111. Edwards, supra note 6, at 362.
112. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 1, at 107 (cautioning that “one should not exaggerate the
problem” and that “[e]xcept perhaps for some human rights treaties, reservation are generally not so
numerous or so extensive as to jeopardise the effectiveness of a treaty”). One analysis, for example,
found that reservations were taken in small number to a minority of treaties (eighty-five percent of the
multilateral treaties examined had no reservations, and only four percent had more than three
reservations), were less common in more important treaties (and in wholly unimportant treaties, too),
and usually had “no marked effect on the operation of the corresponding treaties.” See John King
Gamble, Jr., Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J.
INT ’L L. 372, 376-91 (1980). The findings are not without difficulty. Counting reservations is subjective
and potentially misleading; self-styled declarations, for example, may also purport to modify treaty
relations as would reservations. (Another author, for example, found 900 reservations to a set of treaties
that a U.N. working paper had calculated at 700. Tyagi, supra note 61, at 188.) Gamble’s survey,
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intricacies of reservations probably exceed their practical significance, they
have remained a substantial issue for contemporary multilateral treaties114—
even in efforts at varying from the Convention, as in the Kyoto Protocol and
the International Criminal Court—suggesting that states regard the option as
115
important. Few seriously dispute that the default rules governing their real
and potential application are worth examining.
A narrower and more plausible claim emphasizes the irrelevance of any
other state’s reservations, not reservations as a whole. Judge Rosalyn Higgins
has suggested that in human rights treaties, at least, states may care little about
reservations affecting how another state treats its own citizens, citing the lack
of objections to reservations that are facially incompatible with a treaty’s
object and purpose.116 Indeed, she posited that “one might almost say that
there is a collusion to allow penetrating and disturbing reservations to go
unchallenged.”117 Collusion aside,118 the basic intuition is that states care more
about preserving their right to make reservations than they do about their right
to object—which would help explain why they maintain a regime with
inadequate incentives for objecting. This theory is also consistent with the
tendency of domestic institutions to pay less attention to the reservations made
by other states than to their own.119
moreover, was based on treaties entering into force just five years after the Vienna Convention was
completed, and eight years before it entered into force.
113. HORN, supra note 24, at 370.
114. This is clearest for human right treaties. See, e.g., SANDRA L. BUNN -LIVINGSTONE,
JURISCULTURAL PLURALISM VIS-À-VIS TREATY LAW: STATE PRACTICE AND ATTITUDES 296 (2000)
(estimating that thirty-two percent of the state parties to six human rights conventions had made
reservations to them); LIJNZAAD, supra note 20. But other treaties are also heavily qualified by
reservations. See, e.g., Gary E. Davidson, Congressional Extraterritorial Investigative Powers: Real or
Illusory?, 8 EMORY INT 'L L. REV . 99, 123 (1994) (claiming that “many key states that have acceded to
[the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions] have done so subject to critically important reservations
that serve to undermine their effectiveness”); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a
Decentralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & C OM. 187, 197 (1998) (noting that over forty percent of
parties to the CISG had made reservations, resulting in “significant variations in the text of the CISG in
force in Contracting States”).
115. See supra note 108; infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
116. Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations: Still a Force for Peace, 52 MOD. L. R EV. 1, 11-12
(1989); see also L IJNZAAD, supra note 20, at 397 (describing appearance of a “hypothetical problem” in
human rights treaties, given number of reservations and paucity of objections); Tyagi, supra note 61, at
215 (“States generally do not see any legal interest in or need to object to reservations. In fact, most
State bureaucracies simply do not consider the matter to be important enough to respond.”).
117. Higgins, supra note 116, at 12.
118. One might imagine states refraining from objecting in exchange for a tacit commitment
that the reserving states will not object, in turn, to their reservations. States do prefer to avoid
unnecessarily causing offense, and may risk retaliation in kind when they object. See infra note 215 and
accompanying text. It is also true that some of the leading reserving states themselves make few
objections. Tyagi, supra note 61, at 214 (citing record of Australia, India, Singapore, and the United
States). But those states that object most vociferously do not appear to suffer any increase in objections
to their own reservations, when they make them. See HORN, supra note 24, at 197-99 (providing
selective data on the states most active in objecting to reservations and those offering the most objectedto reservations, and showing little overlap). Nor are there obvious episodes of tit-for-tat behavior. The
United States, for example, drew many objections to its reservations to the ICCPR, but does not appear
once to have objected to any other state’s reservations; like China and Russia, it appears only rarely to
object. See Tyagi, supra note 61, at 214.
119. For example, the U.S. Senate, which is zealous in protecting the ability of the United
States to enter reservations, does not presently receive the reservations made by other state parties.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: T HE ROLE
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Again, however, there are reasons to doubt this explanation’s
completeness. For one, the infrequency of objections may be due to their
insufficient payoff under the Convention, which may or may not have been
deliberate. It bears mention, moreover, that states do sometimes object, and
have created mechanisms that entitle them to do so—to some degree, at least.
(Perhaps the present system captures this ambivalence, but that seems like a
just-so story.) This conjecture also could not explain adoption of the present
system, with its particular eccentricities, as opposed to any other system that
would be equally indulgent toward reservations—such as a permissive
collegial mechanism—or, for that matter, one in which all reservations were
permitted. It becomes a mystery, for example, why states would tolerate the
emerging authority of treaty bodies over reservations, particularly their
120
potential authority to declare a state’s own reservations severable. Finally,
the conjecture fails to explain why states would have stuck with the same
reservations regime for both normative and non-normative treaties. The
answer, perhaps, resides in the hidden virtues of reservations for everyone.
B.

The Interests in Breadth—and Depth

While these initial conjectures undoubtedly explain non-reserving state
behavior to a substantial degree, they do not exhaust the alternatives. The
most accepted interest in permitting reservations, prominent in the Genocide
Convention opinion and in the International Law Commission’s work, is that
they encourage additional states to become parties. 121 Even their critics
122
concede that reservations contribute to developing broader participation.
While the prospective benefit for treaties that are already widely subscribed
123
seems marginal, the era of new human rights-related treaties may not yet
124
have passed. Even the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court,
OF THE U NITED

STATES SENATE 19 (2001) (study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the U.S. Senate) [hereinafter CRS]. But see Reservations, supra note 17, at 178-79 (indicating that, as of
1970, reservations would be communicated to the Senate for its consideration and approval).
120. But see supra text accompanying notes 90, 92 (noting objections by France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States to intervention by the Human Rights Commission).
121. See Genocide Convention, supra note 3, 1951 I.C.J. at 23; supra text accompanying note
28; 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 38-39, [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 207-08 (emphasizing
significance of reservations to increasing participation, and claiming that “the rule calculated to promote
the widest possible acceptance of [multilateral treaties] may be the one most suited to the immediate
needs of the international community”); Gamble, supra note 112, at 372 (“Most arguments in favor of
the liberal use of reservations have as their cornerstone the belief that the liberal admissibility of
reservations will encourage wider acceptance of treaties.”).
122. See, e.g., U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. for the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Preliminary Opinion on the Issue of Reservations to Treaties on Human Rights, ¶
1, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/62/Misc.20/Rev.3 (Mar. 13, 2003) (describing reservations as “le mal necessaire”
in order to “have as many States parties as possible,” and asserting that “[i]t is obvious that many of the
States parties would not have ratified” the CERD “if the possibility of making the respective
reservations was denied to them”); LeBlanc, supra note 67, at 371 (acknowledging benefit of relatively
liberal reservations regimes for the Convention on the Rights of the Child). In fact, officials in human
rights regimes have reportedly encouraged states that are on the fence to explore the possibility of
employing reservations. See Schabas, supra note 47, at 41.
123. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, for example, already has 191 signatories.
124. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; Convention
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
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125

which actually prohibits reservations, illustrates their potential virtue, since
that prohibition probably contributed to the U.S. decision to stay out of the
126
127
treaty. The U.S. sensitivity with regard to reservations is rather extreme,
but it illustrates the broader point that reservations are especially significant
128
for states in which the treaty power is shared.
Treaties sometimes expressly prioritize breadth, and it is easy to
hypothesize benefits even when they do not. 129 An additional state’s
participation can have positive externalities for other participants, or at least
reduce the relative costs imposed by membership.130 Broadened participation
also increases the chance that treaty norms will come to be regarded as
131
customary international law, further advancing the cause of universality.

Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507. Universality clearly remains a significant goal for the
human rights project as a whole. See U.N. ESCOR, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term
Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, ¶¶ 14-36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74
(March 27, 1997) (prepared by Philip Alston) [hereinafter ECOSOC Final Report].
125. Rome Statute, supra note 102, art. 120.
126. The International Criminal Court: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on International
Relations, 106th Cong. 5 (2000) (statement of John R. Bolton) (arguing that “if there were nothing else
objectionable about this treaty, that alone would be a reason to reject it,” and that “[t]he notion that the
Senate in its consideration can’t make appropriate reservations is an unacceptable precedent for the
United States”); William A. Schabas, United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It's All
About the Security Council, 15 EUR. J. INT 'L L. 701, 711 (2004) (noting objection to prohibition of
reservations by U.S. Ambassador to the negotiations and the likely resistance it would have encountered
in the U.S. Senate); cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89
(2003) (arguing that “the ICC depends on U.S. political, military, and economic support for its
success”).
127. International Law in a World of Multiple Actors: A Conversation with Louis Henkin and
Louis B. Sohn, 92 AM SOC’Y INT ’L L. PROC . 248, 257 (1998) (remarks of Louis Henkin) (“If you seek to
destroy the possibility of U.S. adherence to treaties, take away the right to enter reservations. . . . [T]he
United States would stop ratifying treaties.”); see also, e.g., FRY Case Against NATO States Regarding
Air Strikes, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 638, 639 (1999) (quoting statement of John R. Crook, U.S. State
Department Assistant Legal Advisor, that “the possibility of making reservations was crucial to the
ability of the United States to become a party to [the Genocide] Convention”).
128. The increase in popular control over treaty-making, such as through legislative
participation, may be the principal explanation for the growth in using reservations. Bishop, supra note
24, at 263-64. The U.S. Senate, at least, has indicated concern when the United States has agreed to noreservations clauses. CRS, supra note 119, at 15, 274-76.
129. See, e.g., Weston D. Burnett, Mediterranean Mare Clausum in the Year 2000?: An
International Law Analysis of Peacetime Military Navigation in the Mediterranean, 34 NAVAL L. REV .
75, 145 (1985) (expressing concern that the Law of the Sea Convention’s prohibition of reservations “is
so restrictive that it may discourage state participation, thereby reducing the likelihood of the
[Convention] attracting sufficient state parties”).
130. For example, expanding membership in the Kyoto Protocol reduces the comparative
economic disadvantage of existing members. Leadership Costs: What If The EU Leads on Climate
Change, and No One Follows?, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2004, at 16 (noting concerns by EU officials that
European industry may suffer if other industrialized states do not become parties).
131. See Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of
Universality, IOWA L. REV. 295, 296-97 n.20 (1985) (citing Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity
in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT ’L L. 413, 434-35 (1983)). If states adhere to a norm only because
they subscribe to the treaty, however, it is unlikely that it would be regarded as significant evidence of
customary international law, and it is “exceptionally rare” that the treaty would itself be regarded as
creating customary international law. COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN .) INT ’L LAW, INT ’L
LAW ASS ’N, FINAL R EPORT: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL L AW §§ 24-27 (2000) [hereinafter ILA FINAL REPORT]; see also infra
notes 256-260 and accompanying text.
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And state parties will be temperamentally disposed to perceive benefits to
others joining, at least if the terms are not wildly dissimilar. 132
Nonetheless, breadth seems like an insufficient basis for reservations. It
is difficult to determine whether reservations are genuinely necessary to
133
134
secure participation, though states certainly have an interest in saying so.
Not all treaty parties are equals, moreover, and a state’s appetite for
reservations tends to diminish its desirability as a partner. Reservations may, it
must be recalled, impair treaty integrity, uniformity, and consistency among
members,135 and in the aggregate undermine (rather than enhance) any claim
136
to status as customary international law.
Breadth is also an ungainly explanation for the present reservations
regime. States genuinely desiring breadth in a particular treaty could simply
drop any compatibility limits or mechanisms for objecting, or water down
onerous treaty terms. Alternatively, particularly significant potential parties
could be cherry-picked through concessions tailored to their needs, rather than

132. See also James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The Institutional Dynamics of International
Political Orders, 52 INT ’L ORG. 943, 959-960 (1998) (arguing that international political actors, once
engaged in an institution, realize the iterative nature of their relationships, “creat[ing] . . . mutual
confidence and positive trust spirals”).
133. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 38-39, [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 207-08; see also
Gamble, supra note 112, at 393 (“[I]t is not evident that the liberal use of reservations necessarily
encourages participation.”). One dated survey found that treaties permitting reservations received
“proportionately larger acceptances” than treaties limiting reservations (or which contain mainly one
obligation, making reservations unlikely). OSCAR SCHACHTER ET AL., T OWARD WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF
UN T REATIES 148 (1971). The survey also speculated, however, that “in some of these cases, the States
would have accepted without reservations if reservations were not permitted.” Id. at 154-55.
134. Recently, the United States insisted that the bar on reservations in the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control was fatal to its participation. See Jacob, supra note 105; Marc
Kaufman, U.S. Seeks To Alter Anti-Tobacco Treaty, W ASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at A1. However, when
other states held firm it signed nonetheless. U.S. Lights Up Eyes by Backing Smoking Limits, CHI.
TRIBUNE, May 19, 2003, at 5; United States Signs Tobacco Control Treaty, FDCH Regulatory
Intelligence Data, May 11, 2004; see generally Sean D. Murphy, Adoption of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control, 97 AM. J. INT’ L L. 689 (2003). It should be noted, though, that the
Tobacco Convention has yet to be approved by the Senate. The U.S. reversal may also have been
tolerable because less is at stake for framework treaties, which accommodate greater variation and often
require additional protocols. Allyn L. Taylor, An International Regulatory Strategy for Global Tobacco
Control, 21 YALE J. INT 'L L. 257, 294 (1996).
135. Many have noted the conflict between universality and integrity. See, e.g., Gamble, supra
note 112, at 373 n.4; LeBlanc, supra note 67, at 359; Redgwell, supra note 51, at 253. Losing uniformity
might also be regarded as objectionable, for reasons of inter-state equity and mutuality. See M.H.
Mendelson, Reservations to the Constitutions of International Organizations, 45 BRIT. Y.B. INT ’L L.
137, 146-47 (1971). Universality’s cost in terms of treaty integrity is sometimes expressed in terms of
individual rights as well. See, e.g., General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶¶ 4, 17. Whatever the merits of
the criticism, it is curious that the sacrifice of universality at the state level might be defended on the
ground of universality at the individual level.
136. This is clearest if states actually resort to reservations that have an impact on the
observance of the norms in question. See Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law,
81 AM . J. INT ’L L. 348, 370 (1987). It is debatable whether the mere potential for reservations should
count equally. Compare North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 63-65
(Feb. 20) (citing failure to include delimitation of continental shelf areas between adjacent states among
non-reservable provisions as evidence that it was “not regarded as declaratory of existing or emergent
rules of law”), and Oxman, supra note 100, at 35 (citing potential for reservations to the Law of the Sea
Convention to undermine arguments that it established international law binding on non-signatories),
with ILA FINAL REPORT, supra note 131, § 22 (providing that “[t]he fact that a treaty permits
reservations to all or certain of its provisions does not of itself create a presumption that those provisions
are not declaratory of existing customary law”).
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adopting an overbroad approach allowing all states to take reservations.
Finally, breadth cannot redress the purported imbalance suffered by nonreserving states. Both reserving and non-reserving states benefit from
increasing participation, presumably, yet reserving states are certainly the
primary beneficiaries of their own reservations.
A sounder argument, rather, is that reservations increase the depth of
treaty participation. Appeals to breadth suppose a static view of the underlying
treaties, in which additional parties are added without affecting the treaty text;
on this view, reduced commitments by those parties look like a tax on treaty
138
integrity. But this takes treaty contents as a given, when they may well be
139
influenced by the opportunities for self-exemption. If making reservations
were significantly harder, states might subscribe at a lower rate, but they
might also try to obviate the need for reservations by making the treaty’s
terms less demanding.140 Treaty integrity, then, is less than an independent
variable.
It may be perfectly reasonable, moreover, for states to tolerate
reservations as the price for deeper treaty obligations. States may, of course,
exaggerate the salience of reservations to their willingness to accept more
stringent terms; 141 moreover, states willing to accept an additional treaty
142
obligation without reservation may, given the opportunity, reserve anyway.

137. Bishop, supra note 24. As, for example, in the series of Member State-specific protocols
and agreements appended to the Treaty on European Union on matters ranging from the acquisition of
property in Denmark to numerous provisions respecting central banking and the final transition to
economic and monetary union. See Treaty on European Union art. 177, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247, 293-94. Such arrangements are presumably more easily made in plurilateral
treaties.
138. To the extent the bargaining environment is implicated, it is only to note that states
sometimes take reservations in order to achieve through the back door ends that they unsuccessfully
pursued during negotiations. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, On Human Rights Treaties, Contractual
Conceptions and Reservations, in RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS T REATIES AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION REGIME 149, 181-82 (Ineta Ziemele ed., 2004) (citing authorities); see also Tyagi, supra
note 61, at 255.
139. This sort of tradeoff is widely noted both in the international relations literature, see, e.g.,
George W. Downs, David M. Roche & Peter N. Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good
News About Cooperation?, 50 INT 'L ORG. 379 (1996), and in the legal literature, see, e.g., John K.
Setear, Ozone, Iteration, and International Law, 40 VA. J. INT ’L L. 193 (1999).
140. The ability to affect the stringency of treaty terms will depend, of course, on the nature of
the voting rules employed during the negotiating process: were the treaty terms finalized by unanimous
vote or by consensus, the power of would-be reserving states would be considerable, but their authority
under a majority voting rule may be considerably less impressive. That said, the ability to enter
reservations may influence the choice of voting rule. In negotiating the Child Rights Convention, the
Unites States agreed to adoption by consensus, including a provision that prohibited the juvenile death
penalty, so long as states retained the right to enter reservations to such provisions. Report on the
Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, ¶ 544, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/48
(1989).
141. They may also, as in the instance of the United States and the Child Rights Convention,
fail to ratify the treaty at all after securing the right to formulate reservations. See supra note 140.
142. This may be particularly prevalent in divided-power democracies, such as the United
States, in which the institutions charged with negotiation and signature are not identical with those
involved in ratification. See supra text accompanying notes 126-128. Sometimes, however, a state may
be divided against itself, and the Vienna Convention default overcome. See Jacob, supra note 105, at
298 (“[A] surprisingly large number of delegates argued in favor of the [no-reservations provision of the
Tobacco Convention] on the grounds that if reservations were allowed, their own government would be
likely to take some. . . . I watched the representatives of governments that apparently would have liked
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Nonetheless, a default rule favoring reservations is defensible. Negotiated-for
terms are likely to be relatively sticky, and may constrain states that would not
143
otherwise conform their conduct to treaty standards. Limiting reservations,
moreover, increases the incentive for states to participate in multilateral
negotiating (rather than relying on the opportunity to deviate later), which
144
may risk thwarting consensus on any topic under discussion. Indulging
states with a particularly pronounced interest in reserving may, conversely,
play an important role in enabling other states to participate in or lead
negotiations, since states that intend simply to opt out of provisions may
willingly surrender the pen to others.
None of this is to say, of course, that reservations invariably improve
depth. Some treaties involve trades in which states accept a disfavored
obligation in return for others making a concession on a different front;
reservations might fatally undermine such deals, which is why treaties like the
1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)—the classic
145
example of such a “package deal”— prohibit them. But the lesson for other
treaties is mixed at best. The UNCLOS “no reservations” clause was contested
146
147
and contingent, its fifteen-year negotiating procedure is cautionary, and it
only avoided the need for reservations by tolerating declarations,148 allowing

to take reservations to the Convention deliberately acting to deprive their governments of the
opportunity to do so.”).
143. Risk-averse states may be reluctant to commit themselves to additional obligations during
treaty negotiations, but go along if they are provided with a reservation escape hatch—and, thereafter,
fail to take advantage of that option because they have reassessed their concerns, because they had
overestimated resistance to the obligation, or because circumstances have changed.
144. JAMES K. SEBENIUS, NEGOTIATING THE LAW OF THE SEA 207-14 (1984) (evaluating virtues
and vices of adding parties to negotiations).
145. See, e.g., REPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE T HIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 83 (Myron Nordquist & Choon-ho Park eds., 1983) [hereinafter
U.S. R EPORTS TO THIRD CONFERENCE] (“Since the Convention is an overall ‘package deal’ reflecting
different priorities of different states, to permit reservations would inevitably permit one State to
eliminate the ‘quid’ of another State’s ‘quo.’ Thus there was general agreement in the Conference that in
principle reservations could not be permitted.”) (discussing the Ninth Session (Resumed)). Technically,
the UNCLOS permits reservations where “expressly permitted by other articles” to the Convention, but
there are no such expressions. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 309, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
146. See Ted L. McDorman, Reservations and the Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 J. MARITIME L. &
COMM. 481, 490-97 (1982) (describing negotiations). For example, it is notable that the prohibition on
reservations was adopted with the understanding that the most controversial individual clauses might
permit reservations, see supra note 145, and this seems to have satisfied some potential opponents. U.S.
REPORTS TO T HIRD CONFERENCE, supra note 145, at 450 (discussing the Ninth Session (Resumed)).
147. See SEBENIUS, supra note 144, at 182-207 (evaluating strengths and weaknesses of adding
issues to multilateral negotiations).
148. The effect is disputed. Compare AUST, supra note 1, at 105 (noting that Article 310 of the
UNCLOS permits declarations or statements that “‘do not purport to exclude or modify the legal effect
of the provisions,’” and that many states have taken advantage by lodging declarations or statements that
have been objected to as reservations), and Sam K.N. Blay et al., Problems with the Implementation of
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Convention: The Question of Reservations and Declarations,
11 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L. 67, 68 (1984-87) (examining “disturbing” tendency of declarations to modify
legal obligations under UNCLOS), and Burnett, supra note 129, at 145 (noting that declarations permit
states to “circumvent” prohibition on reservations), with John King Gamble, Jr., The 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Midstream Assessment of the Effectiveness of Article 309, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 627 (1987) (suggesting that the initial set of declarations did not significantly degrade the
integrity of the treaty).
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variance in state implementation, and adopting vaguer obligations. These
accommodations are by no means unique, and reinforce the limits of package151
making as a substitute for reservations.
Nonetheless, package deals
illustrate that the interest in depth is most compelling when states must be
cajoled into accepting more stringent obligations than some would prefer, but
less compelling when the deeper obligations are genuinely interdependent.
C.

The Interest in Information

While breadth, and to a lesser degree depth, are easily recognized as
values advanced by treaty reservations, the informational value of reservations
has been entirely unexplored. This is surprising, given information’s influence
152
on international norms and practices.
One of the central values of
negotiating, concluding, and administering international agreements lies in
producing information about other states. As Ken Abbott observed, where
states have incentives both to cooperate and to act independently,
[I]nformation regarding the structure of the interaction, the incentives perceived by other
states, and the compliance of others with their obligations will be crucial to international
cooperation. . . . States will be reluctant to enter into agreements without clearly defined
mechanisms for the ongoing production of reasonably timely and reliable information on
these matters. Such mechanisms . . . may determine the success of an agreement in
practice.153

Many agreements, moreover, are oriented toward information
production not only because of the information’s relative value, but also

149. McDorman, supra note 146, at 496 (noting that the need for reservations regarding
UNCLOS dispute settlement is avoided by the variety of treaty options and the possibility of opting out
of compulsory dispute settlement for a period).
150. Id. at 490 (stating that the package deal approach has necessitated “employing ambiguous
language to achieve agreement where agreement would not otherwise be reached.”).
151. Other notable instances of no-reservations clauses justified in terms of package deals
include the International Criminal Court and the WTO. See, e.g., CLAUDE BARFIELD , FREE T RADE,
SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE OF T HE W ORLD T RADE ORGANIZATION 38 (2001); Sharon A.
Williams, The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court—Universal Jurisdiction or State
Consent—To Make or Break the Package Deal, 75 INT’ L L. STUD . 539 (2000). In the case of the WTO,
reservations may not be made to the WTO Agreement itself, but they may be made to the annexed
agreements. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations ¶ 4, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (Marrakesh agreement establishing
the World Trade Organization). The ICC has no such mechanism. But states postponed any decision
about crimes of aggression or the elements of crimes, see Rome Statute, supra note 102, arts. 5, 9, and
permitted significant declarations, see Schabas, supra note 126, at 711 (citing examples).
152. See, e.g., Randall H. Cook, Dynamic Content: The Strategic Contingency of International
Law, 14 DUKE J. COMP . & INT ’L L. 89, 104 (2004) (“Information-enhancing rules and organizations . . .
provide the principal substantive content of international law.”); Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems in
Treaty Regimes, WORLD POL., July 2002, at 405, 405 (asserting that “information provision by
international institutions lies at the foundation of neoliberal institutionalism. . . .”).
153. Kenneth W. Abbott, “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT ’L L.J. 1, 4 (1993). For other discussions
of the significance of information in international agreements, see James D. Fearon, Rationalist
Explanations for War, 49 INT ’L ORG. 379 (1995); Lisa L. Martin & Beth A. Simmons, Theories and
Empirical Studies of International Institutions, 52 INT ’L ORG. 729, 740-42 (1998). See also HELEN V.
MILNER, INTERESTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND INFORMATION 202-23 (1997) (contrasting prominence of
information in economic analysis and international relations theory with relative neglect in
understanding the domestic politics of international affairs).
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because more demanding objectives are unattainable. Human rights treaties
probably illustrate both explanations. While such treaties do not provide much
by way of traditional sanctions, some do establish elaborate mechanisms for
reporting and, to a lesser degree, review of state policies. 154 The information
thereby revealed may help to influence the behavior of parties and non-parties
in their unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral relations with the state
concerned.155
The difficulty is that information may yet be difficult and expensive to
obtain. With human rights treaties, for example, states routinely violate their
156
reporting obligations, and the quality of their reporting is uneven at best.
Reforms are frequently proposed, but the basic difficulties—the disincentive
for states to disclose embarrassing information about themselves,157 or to turn
158
159
one another in and risk retaliation in kind —remain. As a result, one of
the more modest objectives of the human rights treaty system is badly
160
compromised.
Information is also painfully difficult to generate in other, nonnormative treaties—such as arms control agreements—perhaps because more
is at stake. Information about a state’s present constraints and preferences, and
its expectations for the future, may be more closely held, and less available to
154. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 23, Dec. 19, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Torture Convention, supra note 124,
art. 19.
155. The degree to which these obligations do in fact affect behavior—due, potentially, to some
of the deficiencies in disclosure noted immediately below—is contested. Compare, e.g., Oona A.
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) [hereinafter
Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?], and Oona A. Hathaway, Testing
Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR . J. INT’L L. 185 (2003), with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring
the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT ’L L. 171 (2003).
156. See, e.g., ECOSOC Final Report, supra note 124, ¶¶ 37-59; ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, THE UN
HUMAN RIGHTS T REATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 7-25 (2001), available at
http://www.bayefsky.com/report/finalreport.pdf; ANNE F. BAYEFSKY, HOW TO COMPLAIN TO THE UN
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM 155 (2002); Anne F. Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties
Work, in HUMAN R IGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 229, 234, 286 (Louis Henkin & John
Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) [hereinafter Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties Work]; Dai,
supra note 152, at 427.
157. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF R IGHTS 22 (1990) (“[M]any [state reports to the Human
Rights Committee] are skimpy and almost all of them are self-serving and concealing rather than
revealing inadequacies in compliance.”); J. SHAND W ATSON, THEORY AND REALITY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 155-56 (1999) (describing inadequacy of entrusting
reporting to potential norm violators, including the fact that these states will tend to base reports on
“internal law which they may not be implementing”); Bayefsky, Making the Human Rights Treaties
Work, supra note 156, at 242 (describing complete inadequacy of some state reports, so much so as to
call credibility into question).
158. W ATSON, supra note 157, at 156 (noting that the check on self-reporting is other
governments, which “[i]n order to avoid having to endure the same treatment at some later time . . . have
a strong self-interest in defeating the full potential of the system”).
159. To be sure, genuinely non-state actors may have fewer disincentives, but suffer from more
restricted access to information. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, supra note
155, at 2009 (noting that even domestic and international organizations that are “genuinely committed to
the ends of [human rights] treaties . . . have restricted access to information regarding the real impact of
the treaties in individual countries”).
160. See, e.g., id. at 2023 (“The main method of enforcement and monitoring under the major
universal treaties is a largely voluntary system of self-reporting. The bodies cannot assess any real
penalties when countries fail to comply with reporting requirements, and these bodies possess
insufficient resources to give complete and critical consideration to the reports that are made.”).
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161

civil society. It is easier in theory to obtain information about compliance,
but treaty organizations themselves rarely suffice; 162 for the states’ parts,
163
uncertainty and incentives to mislead persist,
particularly where the
interests of noncompliance victims and their states are not congruent,164 and
165
treaty mechanisms may be needed to generate additional information. Even
where sanctions are substantial, and diminish the significance of information
production as an end in itself, this merely increases the incentives to
dissemble.
Treaty reservations worsen these problems in some regards, since a
state’s ability to exempt itself may diminish its incentive to disclose
information in negotiations, or to comply with any reserved-to mechanisms.
Nonetheless, the potential countervailing benefits, even in informational
terms, may be substantial.
1.

Information about Deviance

First, in formulating a reservation, a state indicates how it cannot meet
(or hopes not to meet) the treaty’s original terms, in the course divulging
private information about its preferences and likely constraints. The
information may be incomplete, of course, in explaining the origin or
significance of the limits; the state’s reservation may or may not be a real
166
prerequisite for its participation in the treaty. Still, such information might
have been otherwise unavailable to non-reserving states, or too costly for them
to obtain.167
The logic may be put in familiar law-and-economics terms. Parties
establishing a default rule need to choose between providing what most
parties likely desire and a “penalty” default that aims at something else—such
as forcing parties to reveal information in the process of contracting around
the rule. 168 Such information may shed light on the parties’ intent, their
understanding of the law and its constraints, or their type (for example, the
risk that it will behave in a fashion inconsistent with the rule).169 Parties will
be reluctant to volunteer such information, however, because it exposes them
161. Abbott, supra note 153, at 14 (explaining that, given the incentives of other states to
conceal negative or conflicting information, “[s]tates will often have to make do with incomplete
knowledge of preferences, relying on reputation, recent experience and their own understanding of the
situation as proxies”); id. at 15 (commenting that, with regard to expectations about the future, “such
information is at least as problematic on an ongoing basis as it was initially”).
162. Dai, supra note 152, at 405.
163. Id. at 409.
164. See id. at 413; see also, e.g., id. at 426 (discussing example of human rights regimes); id.
at 431 (discussing example of environmental regimes).
165. Abbott, supra note 153, at 15-16.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 133-134 (discussing uncertain need for reservations).
167. See supra note 102-108; infra text accompanying notes 232-234 (discussing alternative
mechanisms).
168. Information-forcing is not the only possible reason for choosing “minoritarian” defaults.
See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591,
1593-1606 (1999) (describing other rationales). But cf. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default
Rules in Contract Law (Univ. Chi. John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 237, 2005)
(challenging the supposed prevalence of such rules).
169. Cf. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 168, at 1591, 1606 (discussing contracts context).
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170

to exploitation by a more powerful party or forces them to sacrifice a
pooling-generated subsidy.171
Just so, reservations may be understood as a non-majoritarian means of
achieving partial separation. Absent reservations, states might pool together in
apparent allegiance to treaty obligations that were, on average, weaker and
more ambiguous; with reservations and deeper obligations, the ratification
process distinguishes some states from those pools, revealing salient traits.172
The adoption of deeper treaty terms—facilitated by reservations and by
majority voting, 173 each of which also broadens the number of parties
canvassed—spurs individualized exemption through reservations, revealing
those states that prefer not to meet the heightened obligations.
The importance of reservations as an information-disclosing mechanism
174
should not be overstated. Some information may have been known before,
at least by those that have reason to care. Even then, however, the reservation
may be confirmatory, or make the information more public and tractable,
including by disseminating it to non-governmental organizations. Information
may also have been disclosed previously precisely because the ability to
175
reserve later made doing so harmless.
The instrumental value of any
176
information is also difficult to evaluate.
That said, recent experience is suggestive. Reservations may provide
basic, but otherwise non-verifiable, information regarding compliance with
negotiated treaty terms, as in Pakistan’s reservation exempting its use of
nuclear materials from the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Materials, which permitted other states to evaluate its intentions and
177
formulate objections.
Reservations have also identified more general
170. Cf. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) (considering a private party facing another party with
market power, and the opportunity to use revealed information to take more of the gains of trade).
171. Cf. Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 STAN . L. REV.
1547 (1999) (explaining how an informed party may resist contracting around a default rule when doing
so might eliminate subsidies achieved by lurking within an undifferentiated pool).
172. See Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Uneasy Case for Comparative Negligence, 51
AM . L. & ECON. REV. 433, 456-57 (2003) (“In a pooling outcome, individuals with different
characteristics choose the same behavior. In a separating outcome, individuals choose different
behaviors, each according to her unique characteristics.”). See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD , ROBERT H.
GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, at chs. 3, 4 (1994).
173. On that relationship, see Genocide Convention, supra note 3, 1951 I.C.J. at 22 (“The
majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of multilateral conventions, may also make it
necessary for certain States to make reservations.”).
174. For additional qualifications, see infra text accompanying notes 227-236.
175. Thus China, for example, disclosed to foreign diplomats in advance of signing the ICCPR
that it would attach controversial reservations upon ratification, confident that it would nonetheless be
able to maintain them. See U.S. Interests at the June U.S.-China Summit: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 36 (1998) (statement of Mike Jendrzejczyk, Washington Director,
Human Rights Watch/Asia Division); see also Reservations, supra note 17, at 184 (quoting assessment
by State Department official that other states would not object to U.S. reservations to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil because the reservations had “‘been
discussed informally with all of them’”).
176. It may be expected, however, that vital information implicating national security is likely
to be disclosed reluctantly—and not revealed solely for purposes of reducing international legal
responsibility—and will at the same time be vigorously pursued by other states through different means.
177. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. In that instance, Pakistan has not yielded, but
on other occasions reservations have effectively galvanized international pressure. For example, five
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foreign relations positions, as in competing reservations regarding Kashmir:
the Indian declaration limiting the right to self-determination under the ICCPR
and the ICESCR, which illuminated a serious disagreement between newly
independent states and former colonial powers,178 and Pakistan’s subsequent
declaration that the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings did not apply to struggles for self-determination against foreign
occupation, which elicited a rare objection by the United States (among many
179
others). Last, but not least, reservations provide information about the
constraints imposed by domestic audiences. This is especially clear with
human rights treaties—U.S. death penalty reservations and the Sharia
180
reservations of Islamic states come to mind —but is by no means limited to
them. 181 Given the critical function of reservations in securing legislative
agreement to treaty terms, and in enabling the delegation of negotiating
authority in the first place, it is unsurprising that they would regularly
182
communicate information about local politics.
State practice also suggests that the absence of reservations may
communicate useful information. For example, Australia’s renunciation of
federalism reservations (and federal-state clauses) highlighted domestic
constitutional developments that clarified the extent of the national
183
government’s powers.
Sometimes the signal has instrumental value

African states took reservations when the elephant was listed as a species in Appendix I to the CITES
treaty, but withdrew in the face of international pressure and changed economic circumstances. Bill
Padgett, Note, The African Elephant, Africa, and CITES: The Next Step, 2 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD . 529,
535 (1995).
178. See 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 158 (declaration by India representing
that the rights of self-determination “do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a section of a
people or nation—which is the essence of national integrity”); id. at 162-63 (objections by France,
Germany, and the Netherlands); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 2526 (1993) (noting role of India’s reservation, and objections thereto, in clarifying disagreement over
self-determination); Tyagi, supra note 61, at 194-95 (noting influence of India’s declaration on
international action and academics). The Indian statement, though styled as a declaration, was treated as
a reservation by the objecting states, and was labeled as such by France. 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES,
supra note 70, at 162-63.
179. 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 126, 128-33 (reprinting Pakistani
reservations and objections thereto). The objecting states, again, explicitly treated the Pakistani
declaration as a reservation.
180. One study suggests that domestic law reservations of this type constitute the majority of
reservations to human rights treaties. See BUNN -LIVINGSTONE, supra note 114, at 296.
181. For example, the United States Senate imposed 28 “conditions” on U.S. ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, including a provision barring the transfer abroad of any U.S. samples.
Resolution of Ratification for the Chemical Weapons Convention, S. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997)
(enacted). The impact of that restriction, and the risk it will be copied by other states, illustrates that
inter-state information exchange may not always be beneficial. Michael Krepon, Weak Without Treaties,
WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2002, at A21 (arguing that if other states copy the Senate-imposed conditions, they
might “prevent the discovery of ‘smoking guns’ during challenge inspections”); Barbra Slavin, U.S.
More Talk Than Action on Treaties, USA TODAY , Oct. 27, 1998, at 13A (same). India, which is a party
to the Convention, has considered retaining its samples as part of its implementing legislation. India:
Govt. To Amend Trade Union Act, THE HINDU (Chennai), Mar. 8, 2000, at 11.
182. See Klabbers, supra note 138, at 149, 166-67 (citing deliberations within the International
Law Commission regarding the importance of reservations to domestic politics); see also supra note 19.
183. Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact of Treaties on Australian
Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT 'L L. 1, 18-20 (1995). While the official policy change focused on
federal state clauses, it also addressed reservations. Memorandum from Bob Carr, Premier, to Ministers:
Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties (Austl.), ¶¶ 8.1-8.2 (No.
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precisely because it is unrepresentative. When the United States failed to take
a reservation to the juvenile death penalty prohibition in the Fourth Geneva
Convention, that was cited by international tribunals and death penalty
opponents as evidence of customary international law. 184 None of this
information would be available in the absence of reservations; the significance
of a dog’s failure to bark, to invoke Sherlock Holmes, rests on its ability to do
so in the first place.
2.

Information about Reputation

Reservations also provide a more positive message about a treaty state’s
attitude toward the remainder of the treaty and toward international
obligations in general. Reservation-based treaty deviance is not, significantly,
the same thing as treaty breach: although reservations indicate that a state may
not comport itself according to certain negotiated terms, they also mean that
the state is willing to subject its self-exemption to international scrutiny, and
reaffirm the state’s commitment to those terms to which it has not taken a
185
reservation. By the same token, reservations allow the state to avoid any
generalized inferences about its trustworthiness that might follow in the event
186
of a reservation-less breach.
This interest also sounds in law-and-economics terms—in this case, a
signaling model familiar to international relations scholarship. Signals allow
parties to indicate their type by doing something that others are unlikely to
do—usually by taking costly actions that only those of its type would be
187
willing to bear. If reservations are somewhat costly (because they expose
the state to objections and reveal information about deviance), yet signal that
the state is of a type that takes international obligations seriously, reserving
states may be understood as engaging in a different, more voluntaristic kind of
separation—one that incurs initial costs in order to identify them as less costly
states.
97-01) (1997), available at http:// www.premiers.nsw.gov.au/pubs_dload_part4/prem_circs_memos/
prem_memos/1997/m97-01.htm.
184. See, e.g., Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 ¶ 67 (2002), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
2002eng/USA.12285.htm. That implication was disputed. See Observations of the United States
Government on the Report of the Inter-American Commission Made on October 15, 2001, Re: Case No.
12.185 (Michael Domingues), http://www.cidh.oas.org/respuestas/usa.12185.htm; Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 17, Domingues v. Nevada, 528 U.S. 963 (1999) (No. 98-8327), 1999 WL
33639524.
185. See, e.g., Statement by Lars Magnuson, Legal Adviser, Statement on Behalf of the Nordic
Countries, Oct. 29, 1998, http://www.swedenabroad.com/pages/general____13288.asp (last visited Apr.
29, 2006) (“Reservations carefully lodged can be seen as a sign that the reserving state takes treaties
seriously.”). This is, to be sure, a complex signal. See infra text accompanying notes 192-195.
186. See, e.g., International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 96th Cong. 31 (1980) (testimony of Davis R. Robinson, former legal advisor) (“The rationale
behind the reservations is, rather, that we take our international legal obligations seriously, and therefore
will commit ourselves to do by treaty only that which is constitutionally and legally permissible within
our domestic law.”).
187. See, e.g., James D. Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment,
and Negotiation in International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 88
(David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999). Whether signals must be costly is a point of dispute. See
infra note 228.
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It is difficult to provide examples of state behavior that can only be
explained as signaling. 188 Certainly the decision to reserve ex ante, thus
suffering certain costs in exchange for what is often a future contingency, is
itself suggestive. States unconcerned with reputation might, after all, simply
breach the treaty if the necessity arose, rather than suffering up-front costs for
contingent gain. In the alternative, states might style their departures from a
treaty as mere declarations—which is unlikely to undermine their
189
effectiveness in a pinch —but for the fact that such moves signal bad-faith
interpretation rather than a capacity to respect binding obligations. Finally,
some reservations successes suggest the potential for differentiated signaling.
For example, Russia has been criticized for noncompliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights, but its slow progress in reforming its code of
criminal procedure—for which it entered a “temporary” reservation upon
acceding—appears to have been treated more indulgently,190 perhaps because
its reservation echoed the kind of lawful, measured adaptation that other states
191
had been allowed.
To be sure, international lawyers often hold reputation in higher regard
than states seem to. States do not always value being trustworthy over more
aggressive profiles,192 and they can undoubtedly breach some treaties without
193
endangering their reputation for all others. Proposing particularly sweeping
or numerous reservations, moreover, may call into question a state’s legal

188. See generally Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and
Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 640-42 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS (2000)) (describing difficulty of empirically assessing signaling theories).
189. As noted previously, whether a statement is styled a reservation or a declaration is not
conclusive as to whether it functions as a “reservation” for purposes of the Vienna Convention. See
supra text accompanying notes 107-108, 112. This makes it possible for states to lodge statements they
term declarations, which are less likely to attract objections, and later to rely on them as though they
were reservations. Tyagi, supra note 61, at 181, 212 (noting possibility of abuse, and describing
example).
190. See, e.g., EUR . PARL. ASS ., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian
Federation, Doc. 9396 (2002), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/
doc02/EDOC9396.htm; E UR. PARL. ASS., Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian
Federation, Doc. 8127 (1998), available at http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/
doc98/edoc8127.htm; E UR. PARL. ASS ., Resolution 1277 (2002) on the Honouring of Obligations and
Commitments
by
the
Russian
Federation,
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/
AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1277.htm.
191. Jeffrey Kahn, Note, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European
Convention of Human Rights as a Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia, 35 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 641, 660 (2002) (commending Russian reservation as “impl[ying] awareness in Russian
legal and political circles of the dissonance between European and Russian standards in these areas,”
and as “an entirely proper method of signaling awareness of such noncompliance with expected
obligations under the Convention”).
192. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & E RIC A. POSNER, T HE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 102-03
(2005); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT ’L
L.J. 487 (1997).
193. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 192, at 102; George W. Downs & Michael A.
Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEG . STUD. 95 (2002) (relying principally
on different compliance rates, sometimes even within related subjects-matter). But see, e.g., Scott
Barrett, International Cooperation and the International Commons, 10 DUKE E NVTL. L. & POL ’Y F. 131,
139 (1999) (“A damaged reputation resulting from noncompliance can make it difficult for a deviant to
enter into future agreements. Even a single deviation carries the risk of precipitating general erosion in
law abidance, to the detriment of all states.”).
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194

fidelity to the treaty in question.
Acknowledging this, the reservations
regime affords reserving states flexibility—using reservations to signal a
respect for the remaining obligations, or refraining from reservations in order
to demonstrate an unblemished commitment to a particular treaty—that,
because it permits more state-specific information to be conveyed, is likely to
195
benefit non-reserving states as well.
3.

Synthesis

These two types of information—about prospects for deviance, and a
state’s regard for its reputation—clearly relate to each other. States may be
reluctant to reveal any information, and disclosing how they deviate from a
treaty that they cared to ratify may be singularly unappealing. Disclosure
might, conceivably, merely be the price for the defense that reservations
provide against claims of treaty breach. But reservations also bolster a state’s
reputation by showing that they take treaty commitments seriously enough to
broadcast when they cannot comply, benefiting them by avoiding unwanted
196
inferences from subsequent conduct about their trustworthiness.
This account suggests how the information provided by reservations
may ultimately serve both reserving and non-reserving states. Reserving states
may learn something from how other states react. 197 Indeed, given the
inadequate legal incentives for objecting, non-reserving states probably object
198
in large part because of this communicative value. Reservations may also
ward off potential disputes, for instance by facilitating subsequent agreements.
For example, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, anticipating the inability of
belligerents to agree on protecting powers to safeguard the interests of
prisoners of war and civilians, obliged detaining powers to designate a neutral
199
party to assume those functions.
When Communist states entered
reservations to those provisions, insisting that the detainees’ states needed to

194. See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Report of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/53/38/Rev.1.
(1998) (“Reservations to any human rights treaty . . . indicate clearly the degree of commitment of the
reserving State to full compliance with the particular treaty.”); cf. John K. Setear, Law in the Service of
Politics: Moving Neo-Liberal Institutionalism from Metaphor to Theory by Using the International
Treaty Process To Define “Iteration,” 37 VA. J. INT ’L L. 641, 714-16 (1997) (describing quandary as to
whether to consider reservations as an instance of defection or compliance).
195. See Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559, 617-18 (2002).
196. Additional answers are suggested by the structure of the Vienna rules. See infra text
accompanying notes 228-36.
197. See Anja Seibert-Fohr, The Potentials of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
with Respect to Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, in RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
AND THE V IENNA CONVENTION REGIME, supra note 138, at 183, 208 (“Objections to reservations give
insight into States parties’ understanding about incompatibility.”).
198. See supra notes 187-191 and accompanying text (discussing signaling).
199. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 10, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea art. 10, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3219, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 10, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 11, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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consent to any such choice, that alerted detaining powers, neutral states, and
humanitarian organizations to the importance of consulting those states200—
and influenced the negotiation of Geneva Protocol I, which modestly
improved the ease of selecting a neutral body to perform as a protecting
201
power, as well as creating supplementary compliance mechanisms.
This and similar experiences suggest that reservations may
constructively identify gaps in existing agreements, allowing parties to revisit
202
203
them or to develop other solutions. Such gaps exist, of course, because
agreement on those terms—with those reserving states—is difficult. At the
same time, if the criticisms of reservations are well taken, and reservations are
entered opportunistically, the fact that reservations were taken does not
necessarily signal an impasse. It does, however, vest the non-reserving states
with a decision concerning how to react properly.
D.

The Interest in Reserving

Article 21(b) of the Vienna Convention provides that a reservation
properly established with respect to another state not only modifies treaty
obligations for the reserving state, but also “modifies those provisions to the
204
same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State.”
This reciprocity nominally serves two functions. First, it deters reservations, if
a reserving state’s interest in its reservation is outweighed by the harm (to it)
of extending the reservation to others. Second, if reservations are nonetheless
formulated, reciprocity means that they potentially benefit non-reserving
states too; if another state’s reservation conveys benefits through reciprocity
that outweigh its costs, a non-reserving state may actually welcome it.205

200. Claude Pilloud, Reservations to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 180 INT’ L REV . RED
CROSS 107, 118-19 (1976).
201. George H. Aldrich, The Laws of War on Land, 94 AM. J. INT ’L L. 42, 55-57 (2000).
202. Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes, 42 INT ’L STUD. Q. 109, 109, 113 (1998); see, e.g., Reservations, supra note 17, at 157 (citing
reservations to Economic Agreement of Bogotá as reason to think “‘it may be wise to continue
negotiations . . . in an attempt to secure the withdrawal of the reservations and the conclusion of a more
satisfactory and precise understanding’”); Davidson, supra note 114, at 123 (explaining that reservations
by other signatories to the Hague Service and Evidence Conventions “may offer the U.S. Congress, at
the very least, a starting place to begin negotiating expanded extraterritorial power”).
203. Thus, for example, Switzerland’s reservation to the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, which permits it to differentiate among foreign laborers based on their country of
origin, was criticized as incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW], July 2-20, 1993, Ways and Means of
Expediting the Work of the Committee, ¶¶ 47-48, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/2001/II/4. That brought it to the
attention of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, which renewed the criticism,
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, ECRI’s Country-by-Country Approach: Report
on Switzerland, ¶ 19, CRI (98) 27, available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Ecri/5-Archives/1ECRI%27s_work/1-Country_by_country/CBC1-Switzerland.pdf, and Switzerland modified its policy—
albeit imperfectly. European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, Third Report on Switzerland,
¶¶ 94-104, CRI (2004), available at http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Ecri/1-ECRI/2-Country-bycountry_approach/Switzerland/third%20report%20Switzerland%20-%20cri04-5.pdf; see also, id. at 3435 (reporting response by Switzerland).
204. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 21(b).
205. Thus, for example, British officials evaluating a Libyan reservation to the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations permitting the opening of diplomatic bags observed that, while
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There is reason to think that neither condition is satisfied with any
frequency, and that reciprocity is rarely very attractive. In a recent article,
Francesco Parisi and Catherine Ševč
enko evaluate reciprocity as a possible
solution to what they perceive as a contradiction: while the reservations
regime favors the reserving states, reservations do not seem to be as common
206
as this “natural advantage” suggests. Reciprocity, they conclude, provides a
solution only when the states involved are in symmetrical positions,
207
something that seems particularly unlikely in human rights treaties. (If
anything, they understate reciprocity’s limits, since reciprocity benefits nonreserving states only against the reserving state—meaning that they remain
vulnerable to any other party’s invocation of their treaty obligations—while
the reserving state benefits from the reservation at least in relation to all non208
objecting states. ) The result, in their analysis, is that the Vienna Convention
ensures excessive and sub-optimal reservations, and the solution lies either in
barring reservations or in persuading states to take a keener interest in other
209
states’ compliance.
But perhaps reciprocity simply needs to be understood in broader terms.
Reservations benefit other states when they themselves reserve by, for
example, having set a precedent or increased the prospect that their
210
reservations will be overlooked. Reservations may also confer a different
kind of discretion on the non-reserving. As Richard Bilder observed,
reservations reduce a reserving state’s risk by conferring latitude to deviate
from a treaty’s terms in the future, at the cost of uncertain treaty relations with
non-reserving states. 211 It bears emphasis, however, that non-reserving
states—like reserving states—do not abhor uncertainty; what they wish to

Libya had never exploited the reservation, the United Kingdom was nonetheless entitled to benefit from
it. 60 BRIT. Y.B. INT’ L L. 510, 511-13 (1984).
206. Parisi & Ševč
enko, supra note 97, at 1, 25. Understandably, they do not explain how
many reservations would be predicted (and, thus, how “relatively low” reservations are at present). Id. at
17-20. Their sense that reservations are less common than they might be is consistent, however, with
other assessments. See supra note 112.
207. Id. at 9-24; see also Special Rapporteur, Second Report, First Add., supra note 105, ¶ 152.
To choose extreme examples, it is unlikely that a secular state would benefit from Sharia-related
reservations, or that others would benefit from Belgium’s (former) CEDAW reservation exempting
Belgian law that required the sovereign and successors to the crown to be male.
208. See 1966 ILC Report, supra note 19, at 38 (“[T]he equality between a reserving and nonreserving State, which is the aim of [the objections principles], may in practice be incomplete. For a
non-reserving state, by reason of its obligations toward other non-reserving States, may feel bound to
comply with the whole of the treaty, including the provisions from which the reserving State has
exempted itself by its reservation.”). As noted previously, the reserving state’s position with respect to
objecting states is virtually identical. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
209. See Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 97, at 24 (discussing human rights).
210. Latecomers indeed appear to make more reservations, but it is not clear whether this is due
to the precedent set for them or some other factor—such as the same hesitancy that delayed their
accession, or the opportunity to see how the treaty operates, including at the hand of treaty bodies. Eric
Tistounet, The Problem of Overlapping Among Different Treaty Bodies, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 397 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). Even similarly-termed
reservations, which might suggest imitation, may be better attributed to a similarity of circumstance. Cf.
EVA BREMS, HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALITY AND DIVERSITY 267-84 (2001) (identifying similarities—
and differences—in Islamic human rights reservations).
211. RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 71-73 (1981).
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avoid, rather, is uncertainty dictated by someone else. Under the Vienna
Convention, reservations allow a reserving state discretion as to whether it
complies with a treaty, but they also allow non-reserving states the same
rights inter se, as well as the ability to “reserve” their own judgment regarding
213
the propriety of the reservation.
The interest in this broader kind of reciprocity requires understanding
the complicated perspective states have on objecting. For reasons already
discussed, the Vienna Convention creates surprisingly limited opportunities
for non-reserving states to actually change the reserving state’s policy. But
states may only weakly favor such changes, all things considered. Assuming
214
states care to encourage treaty compliance in the first place, they may
regard another state’s reservations as peripheral to its compliance with the
remainder of the treaty. States may also fear repercussions if they confront
that state, including retaliatory complaints about their own reservations or
breaches, treaty denunciation by the reserving state (thus slipping any
215
216
obligations whatsoever), or simply a chill in relations.
This suggests that non-reserving states might sometimes prefer not to
object, even if they would also have preferred that the other state not
formulate reservations in the first place. In addition, a state may actually
embrace another state’s decision to formulate reservations. Perhaps the non-

212. See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L ORG.
495, 518-23 (1991).
213. Interestingly, a delegate addressing the Vienna Convention put the insurance benefits of
reservations in terms nominally applicable to non-reserving states as well. United Nations Conference
on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, Austria, Mar. 26-May 24, Official Records, 23d Meeting,
¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1971) (Sarin Chhak of Cambodia, noting that “[r]eservations could also
have the advantage of enabling a treaty to be adapted to changing circumstances” and that “[a]
reservation was based on the desire of reserving State [sic] to adapt the treaty to its own needs, but it
could also be based on developments resulting from changing circumstances in general”).
214. Compare, e.g., Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, supra note
155, at 2007 (arguing that human rights treaties reward “positions rather than effects,” and may serve “to
relieve pressure for real change in performance in countries that ratify the treaty”), with Goodman &
Jinks, supra note 155, at 178-82 (disputing implication that ratification reduces international pressure).
For normative treaties, the issue turns on conflicting intuitions as to whether states care about conditions
abroad. Compare WATSON, supra note 157, at 65 (“[I]n the typical pure human rights case, there is
inevitably insufficient interest on the part of other states for them to sanction effectively when
confronted with a violation”), and L OUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS , VALUES AND
FUNCTIONS 253 (1989) (making similar argument), with MENNO T. KAMMINGA, INTER-STATE
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN R IGHTS 136 (1992) (arguing that states join human rights
treaties to put pressure on others to become parties, or in reaction to such pressure), and id. at 56, 61
(citing increasing willingness of states to intercede on behalf of foreign victims of human rights
violations), and id. at 136-37 (citing examples of states willing to object to the reservations formulated
by other states).
215. See CAHDI, Practical Issues, supra note 14 (noting “instances where States have
denounced a treaty to which they had not made reservations with a view to re-acceding to the treaty with
reservations”). The leading example concerns Trinidad and Tobago. See supra note 93.
216. See, e.g., Parisi & Ševčenko, supra note 97, at 21 (“[S]tates may hesitate to object to a
reservation for fear of causing unnecessary tension in existing bilateral relationships.”); Tyagi, supra
note 61, at 215 (suggesting that states “know that an intolerant approach towards reservations may give
rise to legal and political complications”). It may seem incongruous that states face little practical
consequence from objections, yet resent them; nevertheless, objections have raised hackles in the past.
See, e.g., John Quinn, The General Assembly into the 1990s, in T HE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 71 (Philip Alston ed., 1992) (describing sensitivity of Islamic
delegations to criticisms of their human rights reservations).
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reserving state regards its consequent right to object as a chit for trading with
the reserving state, though that right should confer little real bargaining
power. More often, it may perceive that the reserving state will engage in
exactly the same conduct regardless—so that objections are irremediable and
lose face, or simply box the would-be reserver into a treaty breach (and pose
the still more delicate prospect of complaining about that). That states dislike
such legalized confrontation may be inferred from the rarity of formal inter217
state complaints and the infrequency with which even informal complaints
invoke international law.218 In the event a treaty breach is provoked, a nonreserving state faces a more difficult task in disarming domestic
constituencies, which may pressure it to enforce another state’s treaty
responsibilities irrespective of the political costs, converting the sovereign’s
219
right to object or complain into an unwanted political obligation.
To be clear, the point is not that states invariably prefer to tolerate
reservations. Non-reserving states may consider it vital to object to a
reservation—to take a stand in favor of treaty integrity, to protect their
interests inter se, or to enhance their reputations for legal rectitude—or they
may be completely indifferent. Such preferences will vary by state, by treaty,
and over time, 220 just like the reserving state’s interest in exploiting
221
reservations—depending on the status of relations with the reserving state,
222
the behavior of third states,
and domestic dynamics, which may (for

217. This is especially clear for human rights treaties, where mechanisms like Article 41 of the
ICCPR (which permits other states to complain to the Human Rights Committee) are rare and poorly
subscribed. Even among the states consenting to inter-state complaints—seemingly a self-selected group
more tolerant of criticism—not a single one has been lodged, notwithstanding a regular traffic of
individual complaints. One concern is likely the possibility of retaliation, since by their nature such
mechanisms expose would-be complainants themselves—giving rise to “reciprocal inaction.” WATSON ,
supra note 157, at 159 (citing the ICCPR, Torture Convention, and CERD). Another reason may be
adequate informal mechanisms for inter-state discussions. JAMES FLOOD, T HE E FFECTIVENESS OF UN
HUMAN R IGHTS INSTITUTIONS 37 (1998).
218. KAMMINGA, supra note 214, at 58 (concluding that “interceding states appear only rarely
to make a point of invoking the applicable international standards,” and that “[n]o difference can be
perceived in the character of intercessions addressed to states bound by relevant treaty provisions and
intercessions addressed to states not formally bound by such obligations,” and speculating that
humanitarian appeals are more effective and less irritating than invoking international law).
219. See, e.g., Cuba Rights Censure Sparks Uproar, BBC NEWS INT’L VERSION , Apr. 15, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3628435.stm (describing U.S.-sponsored resolution of censure
adopted by the Human Rights Commission, attendant fallout, and criticism of U.S. indulgence of other
states with human rights compliance issues).
220. Every state, however, is subject to such considerations. PETER BAEHR, THE ROLE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN FOREIGN POLICY 157-58 (1994) (noting competing considerations posing dilemmas
for governments concerned with human rights); id. at 145-46 (noting acknowledgment by the
Netherlands that human rights must be reconciled with other aspects of an overall foreign policy);
KAMMINGA , supra note 214, at 57 (noting competing considerations confronting any state concerned
with human rights).
221. For example, objecting might be appealing when the relationship is beyond salvaging, or
perhaps when the relationship is so strong as to withstand disagreement.
222. A more reticent state may, for example, prefer to gauge the reaction of other states; other
objections may reduce pressure to call attention to the problem, provide cover should another state wish
to follow suit, and inform a state’s decision by providing feedback on how seriously other states
perceive the risks posed by the reservation. Some have suggested that prior objection by a third state
deters further objections, because “additional objections would make no legal difference.” Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Effect of Treaties and Other Formal International Acts on the Customary Law of Human
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example) lead a state’s executive branch to prefer increasing or reducing the
opportunities for objection. 223 This contingency is exactly the point. Nonreserving states likely appreciate rules that give them flexibility in reacting to
reservations and, in particular, allow them to reserve judgment as to whether,
how, and when reservations may be opposed—the better to manage the risk
that the reservations themselves seek to control.
IV. REVISITING THE VIENNA CONVENTION
A fuller theory of the interests of non-reserving states permits a fuller
appreciation of the Vienna Convention. To be sure, the Vienna Convention’s
224
drafters may have been inattentive to those interests
or willing to
225
compromise them,
and perhaps state dissatisfaction with the result has
simply been insufficient to spur revision.226 But it is also possible that nonreserving states benefit from the reservation regime and its ambiguities to an
unexpected degree, and that state practices under the Convention are closer to
an equilibrium solution than has been supposed. If so, even the relatively
modest reforms proposed to date by the International Law Commission may
be undertheorized. It is useful, then, to reexamine some of the Vienna
Convention’s ambiguities, and their possible resolution, in this light. This is,
unavoidably, a normative inquiry, but a relatively modest one: the question is
simply whether the potential tradeoffs have been adequately understood, on
the assumption that discernible interests should not be blithely ignored.
A.

The Initial Standing of Reservations

To date, the International Law Commission has not attempted to resolve
the debate between the permissibility and opposability approaches to the
227
Vienna Convention,
even though maintaining a viable opposability
Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP . L. 99, 124 (1995-96). For reasons previously mentioned, additional
objections do make a legal difference, but perhaps not a sufficient one.
223. In the United States, the President has traditionally been less receptive to human rights
concerns and more disinclined to exert pressure on “reluctant friendly foreign governments,” while
Congress has generally been more receptive to populist human rights pressures. HENKIN, supra note 157,
at 67-70, 73. The same dynamic is apparent in other international contexts, such as trade, where
Congress has attempted to constrain the authority of the U.S. Trade Representative to underenforce
violations of international agreements.
224. Negotiators sometimes seemed heedless of distributional consequences. For example, the
convention reversed a presumption that objections would prevent the entry into force of the treaty
between the reserving and objecting parties, but an expert consultant, Sir Humphrey Waldock, opined
that it mattered little which way the rule was stated “provided it was perfectly clear.” United Nations
Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Apr. 9- May 22, 1969, Vienna, Austria, Official
Records, Tenth Plenary Meeting, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/11 (1971). Cf. infra notes 273-278 and
accompanying text (discussing emphasis on clarity).
225. Vaguer standards like incompatibility may have been useful in securing agreement. Cf.
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV .
595 (1995) (discussing purposeful ambiguity in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
226. Contrast, in this regard, the reaction by private parties to Article 2. Robert E. Scott, The
Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV . 1009 (2002).
227. E.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fiftieth Session, at 202-203, U.N. Doc. A/53/10 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 ILC Report] (distinguishing
between definition of reservations and their permissibility and impermissibility); cf. Special Rapporteur,
Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 76 (indicating that “it would be better not to mention the
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interpretation—which lets individual states judge for themselves which
reservations are compatible with the object and purpose of a treaty—seems to
neglect the interests of non-reserving states. In practice, given inadequate
incentives to object, opposability entrusts reserving states with substantial
responsibility for determining what is acceptable to everyone else; while they
likely care whether their reservations generate ill-will, even absent objections,
this may seem inadequate.
Unpacking the interests of non-reserving states helps redeem this state of
affairs, but raises other quandaries. As noted previously, reservations provide
information concerning the reserving state’s likelihood of deviating from the
treaty’s negotiated terms—information facilitated by the prior negotiation of
more stringent terms, which are themselves facilitated by the possibility of
reservations. But why would states divulge such information, which risks
portraying them as “bad,” nonconforming types with whom treaty
arrangements are less profitable? Any reservations regime provides a partial
answer: the principal effect of reservations is to immunize the reserving
states’ related conduct from complaints of breach, and reservations also allow
those states to signal that they take their treaty obligations seriously.
The peccadilloes of the Vienna Convention regime provide additional
inducements. Most significantly, the Convention’s scheme caps the downside
228
of disclosure.
Unlike private contracting, in which a party revealing
information may face renegotiation on key terms, reservations by definition
229
postdate conclusion of the treaty’s terms. The Vienna Convention also
limits other forms of reprisal: as previously explained, reserving states make
the initial assessment of compatibility; ordinary objections, when made, tend
to leave the reserving state with what it sought in the first place; and by
default, no reservation is a cause for severing treaty relations.230 Finally, if
something should go awry, the Convention makes withdrawing reservations

moment when an objection can be formulated” in defining objections, but that it should instead be
examined and addressed separately). Perhaps the most attention to date has been lavished on the proper
terminology. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1-9; 2005 ILC Report, supra note
7, ¶¶ 391-99.
228. This highlights a familiar tension in the signaling argument. If non-reserving states benefit
from the information at the expense of reserving states, this will diminish the number of states willing to
make such disclosures, and thus the significance of the mechanism. If, on the other hand, reservations
are costless—because they have little adverse consequence, or substantial collateral benefits—their
ability to signal anything about the reserving state’s general trustworthiness may be doubted, since a
reservation can be made without sacrifice. For immediate purposes, it suffices to suggest that the signal
is somewhat costly, even if it is not optimized. But cf. David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human
Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV . 879, 882 & n.20 (2003) (noting varying emphases on costliness
as a precondition for signaling).
229. But see infra text accompanying note 293 (discussing objections with intermediate effect,
and reservations dialogues in general).
230. To be sure, much of the potential information is revealed with the formulation of the
reservations, and does not require that those reservations be tolerated. But if reservations were
vigorously and immediately scrutinized, and risked preventing the reserving state from becoming a
party, significant disclosures would presumably become rarer. States would tend to keep mum about any
expectations that they supposed others could decisively oppose, and instead simply engage in that
conduct if and when necessary. If, on the other hand, the consequences of an unacceptable reservation
are less certain, and in any event delayed, states have less cause to be circumspect, and more information
will be produced.
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231

strikingly easy —a feature welcomed, no doubt, by those wishing to reduce
the number of extant reservations, but one that also reduces the risk associated
with lodging them in the first place.
To be sure, the Vienna Convention rules are not the only means of
addressing reservations or generating information. Negotiations over draft
232
treaties that prohibit reservations, or give states only limited options, can
expose the preferences of would-be reservers, 233 as can the choices that states
234
make afterwards. At present, however, such negotiations are held against
the default of the Vienna Convention, so the relevant question is whether
adopting a different default would be more productive. It likely would not,
235
though the matter is speculative. Under a default rule barring reservations,
states would pursue the possibility of reservations (and reveal information in
the process) only if it looked like they might secure sufficient support from
other states; the information about any particular state would also be obscured,
236
save when it led a campaign.
It remains open to debate whether the Vienna Convention’s approach to
the initial standing of reservations elicits the kinds of reservations that
disclose information. Superficially, there is considerable tension. On the
traditional view, the worst reservations are those conflicting with a treaty’s
object and purpose. Once the informational virtues are considered, however,
incompatible reservations become marginally more attractive—since, by
hypothesis, they reveal information keenly relevant to fulfilling treaty
obligations. As compared to other comparably harmful, but compatible,

231. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 22(1) (“Unless the treaty otherwise provides, a
reservation may be withdrawn at any time and the consent of a State which has accepted the reservation
is not required for its withdrawal.”). The International Law Commission is taking a similarly
accommodating approach. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work
of its Fifty-Fifth Session, at 189-244, U.N. Doc. A/58/10 (May 5-June 6 & July 7-Aug. 8 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 ILC Report].
232. See supra text accompanying notes 102-108 (noting alternative treaty forms).
233. Discussions over limited reservations to the Cybercrime Convention, for example,
“highlight[ed] the areas of disagreement . . . and emphasiz[ed] (by their absence) areas of consensus,”
Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425,
440 (2003), and the selection of permissible reservations highlighted areas of likely deviance.
Convention on Cybercrime art. 4(2), Nov. 23, 2001, Eur. T.S. No. 185, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm (permitting reservation by federal states).
Such alternatives, however, do not effectively capture information from parties that bypass
negotiations—though they may compel participation by some states that are disengaged under the
Vienna Convention, expecting that they can freely accede later with reservations—nor do they capture
as effectively disclosures by participants in the ratification process, such as legislatures and domestic
interest groups. See supra text accompanying notes 180-183.
234. Assuming, at least, that some reservations are permitted. If a state is unable to achieve
critical latitude for itself during treaty negotiations, its refusal to sign or ratify generates little additional
information—save concerning the strength of its preference—and the benefits of its participation,
informational and otherwise, are lost. If a state chooses instead to ratify the treaty and later breach,
information is revealed only at a cost to all parties concerned, and without any reciprocal rights for the
non-reserving state. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 60(2), (5) (providing that only states
specially affected or radically unsettled by a material breach may react by suspending the treaty, and
never for treaties of a humanitarian character).
235. Whatever the merits of more tailored options, such as treaties in which reservations may
be made to some provisions and not to others, no default rule could be designed to emulate them.
236. See supra text accompanying note 134 (discussing U.S. lobbying for reservations in
Tobacco Convention).
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reservations, incompatible reservations are also more likely to be legally
ineffective, meaning that (in theory) they convey information with less
tangible consequences. But if the means of constraining the legal effect of
incompatible reservations is imperfect, there is a clear cost to encouraging
them, and an impulse to discourage them somehow.
Because the proper approach to incompatible reservations very much
remains in play before the International Law Commission, it may be useful to
examine several of the Special Rapporteur’s proposals in light of these
conflicting imperatives. Perhaps the most modest, if quixotic, are the
237
standards proposed for identifying a treaty’s object and purpose.
The
unstated purpose is to facilitate objections to incompatible reservations, and
otherwise to deter them; the tradeoff is that carefully delineating a treaty’s
object and purpose encourages reservations that might (mistakenly) have been
withheld or withdrawn as incompatible under a less acute understanding. Such
standards simultaneously serve the more modest function of improving
detection, permitting non-reserving states to identify—preliminary to any
action or inaction—the kind of reservations that are likely to be inconsistent
with the treaty’s ends. The calculus changes for the particularized standards
that the Special Rapporteur has proposed for reservations to dispute settlement
clauses, human rights treaties, and domestic law; here, there seems to be no
correlation with information-production, but rather an attempt to reason from
first principles.238 If such an effort is pursued, it may be more useful to pay
heed to state practice, which might profitably identify the sorts of reservations
to which states were inclined to object if informed.239
Vague reservations, a second area of concern, are another matter. While
240
hopelessly obscure reservations are somewhat self-deterring,
some
reservations test the outer bounds of communication—for example,

237. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add, supra note 7, ¶¶ 75-92 (discussing the
difficulty of the question and a variety of unsuccessful approaches, but nevertheless proposing draft
guideline 3.1.6).
238. The Special Rapporteur’s discussion of reservations to dispute settlement provisions, for
example, acknowledges that reservations to such provisions are common and objections rare, and that
the ICJ jurisprudence is inconsistent with that of the Human Rights Committee, but then appears to
pluck a “[s]ome general lessons” from the experience. See id. ¶¶ 96-99 (proposing draft guideline
3.1.13). After discussing, skeptically, the standards employed by human rights bodies for reservations to
human rights treaties, and noting “the wide range of practices in the matter,” a guideline is proposed that
is “drafted in a flexible way to allow sufficient leeway for interpretation.” Id. ¶¶ 100-02 (draft guideline
3.1.12). With regard to domestic law, the Special Rapporteur opines that “[w]hat matters here is that the
State or international organization formulating the reservation should not use its domestic law as a cover
for not actually accepting any new international obligation even though a treaty would have it change its
practice”—a point which is almost certainly the reason for most such reservations—before indicating,
unhelpfully, that such a reservation “may be formulated only if it is not incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty.” Id. ¶¶ 105-06 (draft guideline 3.1.11).
239. Such an inquiry might also turn up the type of reservations about which states were likely
already to have learned—but the density of objections might be a particularly good proxy.
240. Not only will the reserving states be disadvantaged if it is hard to establish that later
conduct falls within the reservation, but they may find that other states object to reservations that they
cannot comprehend. See Seibert-Fohr, supra note 197, at 194 (“To formulate reservations in specific and
transparent terms should be in a States party’s own interest. It avoids objections and the risk that the
reservation is misinterpreted.”); see also infra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing objections to
an over-vague reservation).
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reservations that allude generally to domestic constitutional or religious
barriers.242 Vague reservations are often criticized as inherently inconsistent
243
with any treaty’s object and purpose,
and some treaties, such as the
European Convention on Human Right, preclude them as part of a bar on
244
“general” reservations. In practice, this is understood not only to preclude
reservations that are so vague or broad as to make it impossible to “determine
their exact meaning and scope,”245 but also to require adverting to particular
246
provisions of the relevant convention and extant provisions of national law.
The Commission has not yet subscribed to the Council of Europe’s
247
approach. An initial passel of provisionally adopted draft guidelines would
diverge somewhat in permitting reservations relating to multiple treaty

241. See supra note 86 (cited sources discussing Guatemalan and U.S. reservations).
242. See generally BUNN -LIVINGSTONE , supra note 114; LIJNZAAD, supra note 20;
RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS T REATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME, supra note 138.
243. Objections to general reservations are sometimes put in terms of a treaty’s object and
purpose, and sometimes allude to a more general norm. See, e.g., General Comment 24, supra note 6, ¶
19 (“Reservations must be specific and transparent . . . [and] may thus not be general, but must refer to a
particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in precise terms its scope in relation thereto.”); U.S.
Observations, supra note 59 (indicating general agreement, though stating that the general comment
goes too far); 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 182-83 (reprinting Finnish objection to
reservation invoking existing national law, stating that “such general reservations raises doubts as to the
commitment of Kuwait to the object and purpose of the [ICCPR],” and “contribute to undermining the
basis of international treaty law”); id. at 186 (noting similar Swedish objection to U.S. reservation to
ICCPR); Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: An Unresolved Issue or (No) New Developments?, in
RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS T REATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME, supra note 138, at
3, 8 (citing views that general reservations violate the object and purpose of CEDAW).
244. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art.
64(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. Other
treaties also bar general reservations. E.g., CITES, supra note 108, art. 23(1).
245. Belilos v. Switz., 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 26, ¶ 55 (1988), reprinted in 10 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 466 (1988).
246. Iain Cameron & Frank Horn, Reservations to the European Convention on Human Rights:
The Bellilos Case, 33 GERM . Y.B. INT ’L L. 69, 99 (1990) (noting interpretation by European
Commission of Human Rights that a reservation is “of a general character if it does not refer to a
specific provision of the Convention or if it is worded in such a way that its scope cannot be defined”)
(quoting Temeltasch v. Switz, App. No. 9116/80, 31 Eur. Comm’n HR Dec. & Rep. 138, ¶ 89 (1983));
id. at 100-05 (construing bar on generality to include reservations relating to the Convention as a whole,
or permitting application to changed domestic law); see European Convention on Human Rights, supra
note 244, art. 64(1)-(2) (providing that states may reserve “in respect of any particular provision” to the
extent of existing national law, which it enforces by requiring that reservations “contain a brief
statement of the law concerned”); Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Reservation Clauses in Treaties
Concluded Within the Council of Europe, 48 INT ’L & COMP . L.Q. 479, 488-90, 512-13 (1999)
(suggesting that Council of Europe reservations practices, which “can claim to have become regional
customary rules,” include a preference for making reservations clauses “as detailed as possible,”
permitting reservations only as to legislation in force, and requesting parties to give brief accounts of
such legislation). These limits, too, are not wholly distinctive. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons art. 19, June 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1532 (permitting reservations “as long
as they refer to one or more specific provisions” of the Convention).
247. Differences are predictable in any event, not the least because the greater stability and
homogeneity of the parties to Council of Europe treaties permits more stringent constraints. Compare,
e.g., Rainer Hofmann, Declarations to the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities: Practice of the Advisory Committee, in RESERVATIONS TO HUMAN R IGHTS
TREATIES AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION REGIME, supra note 138, at 133, 145 (noting apparently
unanimous acceptance of the competence of treaty bodies to test reservations for incompatibility), with
infra note 304 (noting disagreement over the same issue at the United Nations).
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248

provisions, or to the treaty as a whole, notwithstanding the argument that
this is contraindicated by the Vienna Convention. 249 While the Special
Rapporteur has proposed treating a reservation “worded in vague, general
language which does not allow its scope to be determined” as per se
250
incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose, that approach has not yet
been endorsed, leaving vague reservations prohibited by the Council of
Europe opposable by states, rather than barred outright.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, this hesitation is defensible from an
informational standpoint. Even if vague or “across-the-board” reservations
show less than would an optimally detailed reservation, the process of
developing any reservation may be revelatory—occasioning, for example,
public disagreements between a foreign state’s legislative and executive
branches—as might the reserving state’s subsequent responses to objections
and queries from other states.251 Rules that mandate disclosure, moreover, risk
dampening a state’s ability to signal its distinctive characteristics through
voluntarily disclosure—here, by forgoing general reservations in favor of
detailed reservations that more tightly limit its discretion.
The better course may be to eschew any proscription on formulating
such reservations in favor of limiting their utility in practice. 252 One
possibility would be to create a menu of options for individual states
253
responding to general reservations; even if this compromises any unified
effort for treaty-based restrictions on reservations, 254 the resulting
interrogation of reserving states may serve state interests beyond the
bargaining table. If a more draconian reaction is preferred, reserving states
formulating vague reservations may be prevented from ratifying until the
reservations are clarified to the extent feasible. Such an approach may be
presumed inconsistent with the interest in breadth, but it should be recalled
that vague and general reservations are not inherently “incompatible,” and

248. 1998 ILC Report, supra note 227, at 199 (setting out draft guideline 1.1.1 and
accompanying commentary).
249. Id. at 199-201 (noting potential tension with Vienna Convention terms); Special
Rapporteur, Third Report, Third Add., supra note 8, at 12 (same); see Vienna Convention, supra note 2,
art. 2(1)(d) (defining a reservation as relating to “certain provisions of the treaty”).
250. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 115 (draft guideline 3.1.7).
251. 1997 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 123 (“In the case of general reservations, some States
declared the reservation impermissible and requested the reserving State to provide additional
information designed to ensure that such a reservation was compatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty.”).
252. See BAIRD, supra note 172, at 145-47 (discussing plant closure laws).
253. See Recommendation No. R(99)13, supra note 14 (detailing model responses to nonspecific reservations).
254. The Council of Europe and the European Union have both urged cooperative strategies,
including in negotiations, as a means of redressing imbalances in the Vienna regime. Id. (recommending
“common approach”); CAHDI, Practical Issues, supra note 14 (recommendation that states coordinate
in seeking bans on general reservations); Council of the European Union, Note from the Presidency to
the Council on EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism—Update, at 10, Doc. No. 14330/1/04 Rev. 1
(Nov. 29, 2004) (encouraging “[c]oordinated EU position on reservations”); Franz Cede, European
Responses to Questionable Reservations, in DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL AND
EUROPEAN LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KONRAD GINTHER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS 65TH BIRTHDAY 21,
27-33 (Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 1999) (describing attempts to coordinate objections and diplomatic
responses to reservations).
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may possibly be clarified and made opposable by states without posing any
intractable obstacle to ratification.255
Third, the Special Rapporteur has directed special attention to customary
and peremptory norms, taking the position—contrary to that espoused by the
256
Human Rights Committee —that reservations relating to customary norms
are not invariably contrary to a treaty’s object and purpose, noting inter alia
that a state’s reservation may relate to the particular treaty mechanisms and
that the norm’s binding force under customary international law remains
unaffected.257 While acknowledging that nearly the same reasoning applies to
258
reservations relating to peremptory norms, the Special Rapporteur would
nevertheless deem them null and void; the explanation is unconvincing, and is
in any event rooted in considerations having nothing to do with the law of
259
reservations.
Instead of relying on extrinsic principles, the bar on reservations relating
to peremptory norms may conceivably be rationalized in terms of the interests
of non-reserving states. The main point of assimilating such reservations to

255. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 113 (“[I]t is the
impossibility of assessing the compatibility of such reservations with the object and purpose of the
treaty, rather than the certainty that they are incompatible, which makes them fall within the purview of
article 19(c) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties.”).
256. See supra note 59.
257. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 120.
258. As the Special Rapporteur explained, “[w]hile accepting the content of the rule, [the
reserving state] may wish to escape the consequences arising out of it, particularly in respect of
monitoring, and on this point, there is no reason why the reasoning followed in respect of customary
rules which are merely binding should not be transposed to peremptory norms. However, as regrettable
as this may seem, reservations do not have to be justified, and in fact, they seldom are. In the absence of
clear justification, therefore, it is impossible for the other contracting parties or for monitoring bodies to
verify the validity of the reservation, and it is best to adopt the principle that any reservation to a
provision which formulates a rule of jus cogens is null and void ipso jure.” Id. ¶ 136. Clearly, the same
problem afflicting states reserving with respect to peremptory norms—that, while their objectives may
be appropriate, those objectives are not always volunteered, such that a prophylactic rule is required—
applies equally to reservations relating to custom. In excusing the effect on well-intentioned
reservations, moreover, the Special Rapporteur explains that any impact may be ameliorated by making
reservation to treaty-specific aspects of the peremptory norm—a workaround equally available for
reservations bearing on custom. See id. ¶ 137 (noting that “there are other ways for States to avoid the
consequences of the inclusion in a treaty of a peremptory norm of general international law: they may
formulate a reservation not to the substantive provision concerned, but to ‘secondary’ articles governing
treaty relations (monitoring, dispute settlement, interpretation), even if this means restricting its scope to
a particular substantive provision”).
259. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 146 (draft guideline 3.1.9);
id. ¶ 137 (noting that “this prohibition [on reservations relating to peremptory norms] does not result
from article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention but, mutatis mutandis, from the principle set out in Article
53”); see Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”). But Article 53 prevents treaties from
forcing conflicts with peremptory norms, rather than addressing whether treaties may be disapplied
when state behavior would remain regulated by such norms. While the Special Rapporteur also asserts,
citing legal commentary, that “the rule prohibiting derogation from a rule of jus cogens applies not only
to treaty relations, but also to all legal acts, including unilateral acts,” Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report,
First Add., supra note 7, ¶ 135, the derogation implied by a reservation is weak—it is no different in
consequence from a state’s failure to ratify the same treaty on the ground that it reflects a peremptory
norm, which presumably is not foreclosed—and not a unilateral act of the kind normally meant.
If successful, however, this reasoning would distinguish reservations relating to custom. See id. ¶
120 (noting that “unlike the case of peremptory norms, states may opt out [of customary rules] by
agreement inter se.”).

352

THE YALE J OURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31: 307

those violating object and purpose is to make them more than merely
opposable—since, after all, states are already free to object on the ground that
a reservation violates a peremptory norm and to judge for themselves the
merits of any absolute position to that effect—and to serve non-reserving
260
states by holding other states to those norms. There is relatively little
offsetting cost. Any negative effect on breadth and depth should be trivial;
since reserving states are in theory completely constrained by such norms
even absent the treaty, barring reservations should not substantially affect
their willingness to bargain or ratify. The capacity of non-reserving states to
reserve judgment would also be enhanced, to the extent that inconsistency
with peremptory norms is not self-defining and may be asserted at those
states’ convenience. 261 The clearest loss is information, given that the bar
would marginally reduce the incentive for states to object and, consequently,
to help articulate the underlying norms. 262 Considering these sorts of nonreserving state interests offers no clear prescription, but it at least situates the
analysis within the premises of reservations doctrine, rather than outside it.
Finally, while maintaining lexical neutrality in the debate between
263
permissibility and neutrality,
and explicitly hedging regarding the
264
consequences of state violations, the Special Rapporteur has tentatively
addressed the fundamental and vexing question of the effects of formulating
reservations contrary to a treaty’s object and purpose—indicating that any
such reservation is “not valid,” “null and void,” and beyond redemption via

260. It is not a certainty, however, to the extent that mingling nascent peremptory norms with
treaty obligations may make their independently obligatory character more difficult to perceive. Such a
consideration also suggests, moreover, that disclaiming automatic nullity—as the Special Rapporteur
would for reservations relating to custom and, in a similar fashion, for non-derogable principles—
reduces such opportunities. Id. ¶ 129 (setting out draft guideline 3.1.8 for reservations relating to
custom); id.
¶ 146 (setting out draft guideline 3.1.10 for reservations relating to non-derogable rights).
261. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4, 19, 514-17 (5th ed. 1998);
see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 51, §
331 cmt. e (advising that “a peremptory norm would be invoked by a party as a basis for invalidating its
consent, or for terminating the agreement . . . but the uncertain scope of the doctrine makes particularly
strong the need for an impartial determination of its applicability,” and that “[a] domestic court should
not on its own authority refuse to give effect to an agreement on the ground that it violates a peremptory
norm”).
262. Cf. COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT 'L L AW, INT' L L AW ASS 'N, FINAL
REPORT: STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL L AW 21 (2000) (suggesting that “it could probably also be shown that all or most . . .
‘axiomatic’ principles . . . actually took some time to become generally accepted”). Peremptory norms
may, of course, succeed one another. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 53 (“For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”).
263. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, supra note 7, ¶¶ 1-8 (settling on use of term “validity”
in preference to prejudging the question).
264. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶¶ 195-99 (reviewing
considerations); id. ¶ 200 (indicating that “[i]t is too early for the Commission to take a position on
whether the nullity of the reservation invalidates the consent to be bound itself”). One proposed draft
guideline would, probably unnecessarily, clarify that a state proposing a reservation that is contrary to a
treaty’s object and purpose does not thereby assume tort liability. Id. ¶ 194 (setting out draft guideline
3.3.1, improperly noted as guideline 3.1.1).
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the acceptance of non-reserving states. The implications of the Special
Rapporteur’s position, and whether it will be accepted by the Commission, are
as yet unclear, but the rationale is revealing. The reasoning, unsurprisingly, is
heavily doctrinal and purposive, and tries to minimize two points that are
essentially conceded—first, that this “‘normative gap’ may . . . have been
266
deliberately created by the authors of the Convention,” and second, that in
contrast to the comparison case of reservations expressly or implicitly barred
by a treaty, it is relatively difficult for a reserving state to discern whether a
treaty’s object and purpose are at risk.267
While these are treated as grudging admissions, they may actually be
strong arguments for the Special Rapporteur’s approach, for reasons that have
already been spelled out. The Convention’s drafting history indicates that “the
admissibility or otherwise of a reservation [under Article 19(c)] is in every
case very much a matter of the appreciation of the acceptability of the
reservation by the other contracting States,” and that the bar on incompatible
reservations “has to be read in close conjunction with the provisions of
[Article 20] regarding acceptance of and objection to reservations,” in no
small part because it was understood that a treaty’s object and purpose were
not transparent. 268 Absent any self-enforcing mechanism for rebuffing and
discouraging arguably incompatible reservations, the notion that such
reservations are null and void ab initio—subject, in the end, to their eventual
evaluation by non-reserving states, which may not be of one mind—
potentially effects a substantial transfer of authority to the non-reserving state,
without dampening the other values reservations may serve. The scope of that
authority depends on the ancillary rules regarding the consequences, including
those relating to the form, timing, and effect of objections.
B.

The Form and Timing of Objections

As discussed in Part I, one factor encouraging late objections is the
unresolved tension between the permissibility and opposability schools. If
incompatible reservations are genuinely void ab initio, then non-reserving
states need not object at all, and if they do they are surely entitled to relief
from the normal twelve-month deadline. Indeed, states sometimes expressly
justify late objections with the argument that impermissible reservations can
never be tacitly accepted, and the Secretary-General appears to indulge them
269
to some degree.
The International Law Commission has yet to speak to this issue, and it
should tread carefully when it does. Reinforcing the twelve-month limit might
be seen as a way of encouraging states to file what are now dilatory objections

265. See id. ¶¶ 187, 200, 202 (proposing, respectively, draft guidelines 3.3, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3).
266. Id. ¶ 181.
267. Id. ¶ 185 (comparing object-and-purpose inquiry with other grounds for invalidity
arguably more observable by reserving states); see also, e.g., id. ¶ 147 (noting subjectivity of inquiry).
268. 1966 ILC Report, supra note 15, at 57, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 226; see also
Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Add. 2, supra note 7, ¶ 182 (describing drafting history).
269. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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on time. But delay also serves more enduring interests—in particular, the
interest in recovering some of the risk management allocated to the reserving
state. If non-reserving states are able to formulate late objections, at least in
the case of arguably incompatible reservations, they may wait to see if
objecting is advisable—and diminish the certainty and flexibility that the
reservation affords its author. On this view, late objections and their tolerance
are less a lack of discipline than an attempt to exploit a doctrinal ambiguity
central to the Vienna Convention. One might be wary, then, of disturbing this
situation, particularly if it would further diminish the defenses available to
271
opponents of reservations.
This equipoise is indirectly affected by the Commission’s early work on
the form of objections. One relevant initiative concerns standards of clarity for
objections. The Special Rapporteur, reacting to the prevalence of tentative or
quasi-objections, 272 has opined that “legal security” required determining
whether such responses are true objections, much as the interest in certainty—
and the tendency of states to speak ambiguously—required more precise
reservations. 273 But the fact that reservations and objections may each be
274
vague does not commend an identical solution. For reasons previously
discussed, reservations purposefully shift the costs of uncertainty to nonreserving states; uncertainty about the effect of a response to a reservation
may help level the playing field, much like the lingering possibility that an
incompatible reservation may draw objections after a year has passed. To be
sure, it may be prudent for states to make the grounds for their objections

270. As noted previously, some states devote insufficient resources and attention to
reservations; reinforcing the deadline might have an effect not only on the kind of objections that are
now lodged after a year’s passage, but also those that states never make after discovering that the
deadline has passed. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 37, at 313 (citing example of would-be objections by
Sweden to reservations by Egypt, Mauritius, Jamaica, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to
CEDAW, for which Sweden ran out of time but noted putatively “as a matter of principle”).
271. If anything, two aspects of the Commission’s project indirectly support delayed objecting.
First, its draft guidelines would permit late reservations, which vest non-reserving states with the
aggregate power to extend their decision horizon, since late reservations may be made only if no state
objects within twelve months. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its Fifty-Third Session, at 476-506, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001)
[hereinafter 2001 ILC Report] (setting out draft guidelines 2.3.1 et seq. concerning late reservations,
with accompanying commentary). A provision with similar effect concerns the enlargement of
reservations. See 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, ¶¶ 353-55 (summarizing discussion); Koskenniemi
& Mosley, supra note 7, at 108-09 (same); 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, at 260, 269-74 (setting out
draft guideline 2.3.5, with accompanying commentary).
Second, as discussed more extensively below, the Commission would also approve of the
depositary’s power to draw “manifestly impermissible” reservations to the attention of interested parties.
See infra notes 318-324 and accompanying text. The ongoing review this suggests, which almost
certainly extends beyond any twelve-month deadline, seems inconsistent with any pure opposability
approach, and would encourage belated incompatibility objections. Cf. Hampson Report, supra note 13,
¶ 33; Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶ 163 (rejecting argument that the
right of treaty monitoring bodies to opine regarding reservations should be limited to similar twelvemonth period).
272. See supra note 71.
273. Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82, ¶ 3; Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report,
First Add., supra note 71, ¶¶ 91-92.
274. Cf. Topical Summary 2004, supra note 55, ¶¶ 177-92 (summarizing criticisms of the
parallel); see also Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82, ¶¶ 6-29 (describing debate).
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plain, particularly if that might secure the reservation’s withdrawal. But the
virtues of insecurity—coupled with the risks of misclassifying a state’s
276
response —seem to outweigh the benefits of any Commission intervention.
At a minimum, due indulgence should be given to states’ tentative reactions to
general reservations, which sometimes condition the position of non-reserving
277
278
states or simply reserve judgment, at least until such point as other
methods for querying reservations may be developed.
A second issue concerns a false cognate of general reservations—
general objections, by which states make it known that they object to any
279
reservations to a treaty, indicate a class of unacceptable reservations, or list
280
states that have entered disfavored reservations. Notwithstanding criticism
that such objections are unduly vague,281 they may more effectively convey
the nature of a state’s position, or make up for any vagueness with efficiency.
As relevant here, their function may also be to circumvent any stringent
approach to the deadline for objections, or even to invert the possibility of
tacit acceptance—since states desiring to resist reservations may, in theory,
275. See, e.g., Topical Summary 2004, supra note 55, ¶¶ 198-99 (reporting support for “the
prompt circulation of the reasoning for objecting to reservations as a means to induce the reserving party
to reconsider its position and possibly withdraw the reservation,” including because doing so might
attract the support of other non-reserving states); id. ¶¶ 199-200 (reporting view that while states were
increasingly willing to articulate the grounds for their objections, practice was mixed, and it “was a
policy issue rather than a legal question”).
276. While the Special Rapporteur’s approach would allow statements to be deemed objections
regardless of how a state labels them, see Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82, ¶ 3, and
would not categorically exclude statements that pursue unorthodox effects, see id. ¶¶ 14-19, the
approach would certainly exclude statements that do not “purport” to deny the reserving state that which
it seeks. Id. ¶¶ 14-19; Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 91. This is an
exclusivity that is lacking under the present regime, and which may limit the ability of states to employ
place-holding statements that are fully eligible to become objections at a later point.
277. See, e.g., 1 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 306 (reprinting Austrian response
to Malaysia’s reservations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, concluding that the “general
character” of the reservations prevented their final assessment, and conditionally objecting pending
further information from Malaysia or subsequent practice confirming compatibility with the
Convention’s object and purpose); Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶¶ 8889; cf. 2 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 70, at 248-49 (statements by Germany and the
Netherlands, in connection with the Convention on the High Seas, making objections dependent on
whether statements by other states were more than mere declarations). Were states denied the
opportunity to lodge provisional or tentative objections, they might always have recourse to definite
objections based on a provisional appraisal, but that sacrifices a degree of flexibility. See, e.g., id. at
306-10, 313 (noting objections by Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and
Sweden to the Malaysian reservation, and communications from Belgium and Denmark).
278. See, e.g., 2 MULTILATERAL T REATIES, supra note 70, at 243 (statement of the Netherlands
to the effect that it “reserves all rights” regarding Venezuelan reservations to the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone).
279. Thus, Greece stated that it would not accept any prior or future reservations to the
Genocide Convention. See id. at 128. But cf. id. (separate objection by Greece to U.S. reservation).
Similarly, the U.S. Senate stated in identical terms that it would not countenance (other) reservations to
any of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 199 (signing
statement of President Eisenhower) (“Rejecting the reservations which States have made with respect to
the Geneva convention . . . the United States accepts treaty relations with all parties to that convention,
except as to the changes proposed by such reservations.”).
280. See HORN, supra note 24, at 184, 196-97 (citing examples); e.g., 2 MULTILATERAL
TREATIES, supra note 70, at 331-33 (statements by Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden that they object
to any reservations made to the dispute settlement provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties).
281. Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, at 10 n.135 (citing Horn).
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lodge a general objection and later retract such objection piecemeal, as need
be, in response to acceptable reservations.
A third initiative involves withdrawing reservations. The Vienna
Convention explicitly allows unilateral withdrawal,282 but it does not address
the question of partial withdrawals—actions by which reserving states purport
to narrow, without relinquishing, reservations they have previously
formulated.283 The Commission has waded into a rather tedious debate about
whether partial withdrawals were better characterized as amendments of
reservations or as withdrawals followed by the substitution of new (and
284
narrower) reservations —favoring the former view, which, it reasons,
285
suggests that partial withdrawal should be virtually unfettered.
A theory of the interests of non-reserving states suggests a less doctrinal
approach. Partial withdrawals tend to be viewed favorably because they
reduce the pox of reservations on multilateral treaties in a manner consistent
286
with state consent. On a broader view, partial withdrawals are helpful in
conveying additional information about the reserving state’s preferences, but
they are not an unalloyed good. A permissive approach may artificially
encourage states to formulate broader reservations initially, since they can
always narrow them later on—thus reducing the risk that any overbroad
reservation may be indicted as incompatible en toto by a state or treaty body,
287
or come to be more favorable to non-reserving states enjoying reciprocity.
Partial withdrawals may thus shift the balance of interests perceived by nonreserving states, necessitating objection. The Commission has suggested that
objecting to partial withdrawals is permissible only if the resulting reservation

282. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 22. The possibility of partial withdrawals was vetted
during the drafting of the Convention, but it appears to have been dropped without explanation. 2003
ILC Report, supra note 231, at 246-47.
283. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 244 (detailing draft guideline 2.5.10, defining partial
withdrawal as that which “limits the legal effect of the reservation and achieves a more complete
application” of the treaty to the withdrawing party).
284. Partial withdrawals have not been wholly uncommon in practice, see 2003 ILC Report,
supra note 231, at 252-53 (citing examples), but absent specific provision for them in particular treaties,
see id. at 245-46 (citing examples), opinion regarding their nature seemed to divide along the indicated
lines—albeit with some confusion. Compare 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 248-51 (citing
practices under Council of Europe treaties generally supporting amendment theory), with Summary of
Practice, supra note 73, ¶ 206 (describing position of the U.N. Secretary-General that changing
reservations “amount[s] to a withdrawal of the initial reservations—which raised no difficulty—and the
making of (new) reservations”). But cf. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 254-55 (citing U.N.
communications taking the view that “as far as possible, communications which are no more than partial
withdrawals of reservations should not be subjected to the procedure that is appropriate for
modifications of reservations”).
285. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 244-46 (citing “point of departure of draft guideline
2.5.10” that “nothing prevents the modification of a reservation if the modification reduces the scope of
the reservation and amounts to a partial withdrawal”); 1997 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 127, ¶ 10
(stating preliminary conclusion that a state formulating an inadmissible reservation may react, inter alia,
by “modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility”).
286. See, e.g., 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 251 (opining that “the treaty’s integrity is
better ensured” by permitting partial withdrawals).
287. The Commission views these as advantages—as they may be, not the least to the reserving
state. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 251 (citing possibility that partial withdrawals will defuse
objections); id. (adding that partial withdrawals permit longstanding parties to adapt reservations to any
treaty body’s views regarding incompatibility, reducing an advantage otherwise accruing to parties
joining in contemplation of the body’s views).
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discriminates against the non-reserving state, but that is bottomed on a
purely mechanical view of the withdrawal’s effect on the reserving state’s
289
obligations. It is at least equally plausible that the resulting reservation
better communicates a position that the non-reserving state wishes to oppose,
or perhaps even deprives it of any credible claim that the reservation was
inadmissible and thus could legitimately have been objected to at any point. In
short, the guidelines would be well advised to recognize, along with the
innovation of partial withdrawal, a robust right to object to same. The effect of
such objections is another matter entirely.
C.

The Effect of Objections

An enduring enigma of the Vienna Convention concerns the effect of
objections. Article 21 of the Convention suggests three possible paths for nonreserving states—acceptance, a simple objection with “minimum” effect, and
an objection with the “maximum” effect of denying treaty relations with the
reserving state—with puzzlingly little difference between the first two. The
weakness of simple objections is particularly striking when the objections are
predicated on a reservation’s incompatibility with a treaty’s object and
purpose.
As previously noted, practice has not stood pat. In recent years, states
have asserted the power to determine which treaty provisions remain in force
after a reservation has been formulated, including by disapplying treaty
provisions other than those that were the subject of the reservation (objections
with “intermediate effect”) or, conversely, asserting that the entire treaty
remains in force between the reserving and objecting states (those with
290
“super-maximum” effect). These innovative objections are most common in
291
relation to human rights treaties, but their rationale is not so confined.
These practices are of uncertain legality,292 due in part to the unresolved
status of incompatible reservations and the behaviors they may justify, and are

288. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 256 (reprinting draft guideline 2.5.11); see id. at 259
(acknowledging that “there seems to be no example” in which a partial withdrawal resulted in
discrimination against particular parties).
289. The Commission reasoned that a partial withdrawal brings the reserving state into closer
conformity with the treaty, and thus is no different in principle than a complete withdrawal, at least on
the assumption that other parties “have adapted to the initial reservation.” 2003 ILC Report, supra note
231, at 259.
290. 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, at 276 (discussing interpretive declarations); Special
Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 95; see, e.g., 2 MULTILATERAL T REATIES, supra
note 70, at 330 (statement that “Canada does not consider itself in treaty relations with [Syria] in respect
of those provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the compulsory
conciliation procedures set out in the annex to that Convention are applicable”); id. at 331-35 (similar
statements by Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in relation to
reservations to dispute settlement provisions).
291. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
292. The expressio unius maxim suggests that specifying two types of objections was intended
to preclude others; attempts to defend innovative objections, therefore, sometimes portray them as
constructive law-breaking. See, e.g., Klabbers, supra note 16, at 187-88. Other opinion is more
equivocal. See, e.g., 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, ¶ 346 (recalling that, as relevant to innovative
objections, “the regime of objections was very incomplete”); Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First
Add., supra note 71, ¶ 95 (alluding to insufficiency of relying on the options established by Article 21).
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also of uncertain status within the Commission. Some participants have
expressed the view that objections with intermediate effect are an established
293
294
practice, while others liken them to unlawful reprisals. Objections with
super-maximum effect are viewed with greater hostility, on the ground that
they—unlike objections with intermediate effect—profoundly “diverged”
295
from the “consensual framework on which the Vienna regime was based,”
though they too have their supporters.296 Criticisms have to date had relatively
little purchase. The Special Rapporteur’s initial attempt to define objections in
terms of the legal consequences sought was criticized, and later withdrawn,
because it was regarded as prejudging (and excluding) the validity of
297
innovative objections. The now-prevailing draft definition of objections
does not seek to exclude either type, 298 and it may be doubted, given the
difficulty of reconciling rival views on the Commission, whether subsequent
articles will be successful in doing so.299
What explains this state of affairs? On the one hand, some states that
regarded the Vienna Convention as imbalanced, to the extent that they
cooperatively created innovative objections and applauded their inclusion on
300
the Commission agenda, appear to accept that they will secure no clear
license for them. Their failure casts doubt on any hypothesis that the
Convention’s terms are a mistake that states are committed to rectifying. But
it is also hard to reconcile this situation with the view that reservations are
irrelevant, given opposition to innovative objections within the Commission,
293. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 95 (describing
intermediate effect as an “established practice” among states).
294. 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 285.
295. Id. ¶ 293(d) (remarks by the Special Rapporteur); see also Special Rapporteur, Ninth
Report, supra note 82, ¶ 20 (indicating discomfort with the notion that objections could “maintain[] that
the treaty as a whole is binding upon the author of a reservation despite its reservation”); Topical
Summary 2005, supra note 7, ¶ 89 (noting similar criticism); Topical Summary 2004, supra note 55, ¶
192 (same); 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 289 (same).
296. See, e.g., Topical Summary 2005, supra note 7, ¶¶ 85-96 (noting support and criticism).
297. Id. ¶¶ 85-87 (summarizing discussions); Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82,
¶¶ 12-14 (acknowledging and agreeing with criticisms); Koskenniemi & Mosley, supra note 7, at 99100 (summarizing discussions at the Commission’s 2003 meetings); Michael J. Matheson, The FiftySixth Session of the International Law Commission, 99 AM . J. INT ’L L. 211, 216-17 (2005) (summarizing
discussions at the Commission’s 2004 meetings); Michael J. Matheson & Sara Bickler, The Fifty-Fifth
Session of the International Law Commission, 98 AM. J. INT ’L L. 317, 320 (2004) (summarizing
discussions at the Commission’s 2003 meetings).
298. Compare Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, First Add., supra note 71, ¶ 97 (suggesting
that objections with super-maximum effect were not “objections” within the meaning of the Vienna
Convention), with Special Rapporteur, Ninth Report, supra note 82, ¶ 14 (changing draft definition to
“include in the definition of objections the unilateral statements purporting to produce effects not
provided for in the Vienna Conventions” (emphasis omitted)); id. ¶¶ 14-20.
299. It would be particularly difficult to justify intuitions that while super-maximum objections
seemed to fall outside the Vienna Convention, objections with intermediate effect prima facie fall within
it. See 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 293(d). So far as state consent is concerned, each objection
proposes a bargain to which the reserving state has not agreed. If anything, the objection with super
maximum effect is arguably less transgressive, since in those instances the treaty’s terms are restored to
their condition but for the reserving state’s violation of Article 19; an objection with intermediate effect,
in contrast, leaves a more uncertain, jury-rigged result in place. Cf. Topical Summary 2005, supra note
7, ¶ 93 (cautioning that such objections “might leave a treaty permanently open”).
300. Magnuson, supra note 85, at 349-50 (quoting statement by Swedish representative to the
Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly relating to inadmissible reservations and objections
with super-maximum effect).
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or with the notion that the interest in reservations always prevails. Are the
interests favoring and disfavoring reservations simply in a standoff, or is it
impossible to achieve the Commission’s commitment to leaving both the
Vienna Convention and state practices intact?301
The key is to appreciate innovative objections in terms of the subtler
interests articulated earlier. Until they are expressly countenanced, such
objections do not shift authority from reserving to non-reserving states, since
neither conclusively gives the objecting state the end it asserts. Instead, they
counter one uncertain expression of treaty relations (the reserving state’s
submission that the treaty is modified by an incompatible reservation) with
another. Given this, the tolerance of objections by states favoring reservations
is not wholly surprising. At the same time, innovative objections do more than
simply muddy the waters. For one, such objections counter the reserving
state’s power of initiation. Non-reserving states are liberated to choose among
several options, which vary in likelihood of provoking the reserving state.
Those options include: express acceptance; silence (and tacit acceptance);
querying a reservation; objections with incidental effect; objections that
propose reformulating treaty relations; objections that deny treaty relations;
and objections that would keep the whole treaty in effect. The practical effect
is that reserving states no longer unilaterally manage the risks of treatymaking. The inconclusive character of innovative objections also allows them
to act like placeholders, or even preliminary objections, that extend the time
302
horizon for mutual evaluation by the reserving and objecting states —even
while signaling a basis by which other states, too, may lodge late objections or
otherwise oppose a reserving state’s invocation of its limited obligations.
The theory of non-reserving state interests is equally germane to the
assertion by some treaty monitoring bodies of authority to determine the
standing of reservations. Such assertions pose a similar puzzle: why would
states continue to tolerate them? Reserving states have sometimes responded
303
vociferously to such intervention. Even if treaty bodies rarely intervene in
practice, it might do to decisively repudiate their asserted authority to do so,
unless states wanted to rectify the Convention’s widely acknowledged biases.
Even the consensual interests of non-reserving states in making their own
determinations about whether to object seem compromised.
The Special Rapporteur’s view is that the more parties capable of
opining about reservations, the merrier; to that end, he has proposed draft
guidelines indicating that treaty bodies are competent to assess the validity of
301. Cf. Diplomatic and Parliamentary Practice, 13 ITALIAN Y.B. INT ’L L. 265, 265 (2003)
(quoting comments of Italian delegate to the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly that the
Commission’s guidelines should not modify “the effect of objections, which should remain the same as
defined in the Vienna Convention,” but alluding as well to the Convention’s unsatisfactory character and
to the Commission’s more general “mandate not to change anything in the treaty regime”).
302. See also infra text accompanying notes 308-310 (discussing, and contrasting,
“reservations dialogue”).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 90 & 92. States may, perhaps, “have become less
unwilling to respond to intercession by a respected multilateral body in limited circumstances” while not
“much more willing to scrutinize or be scrutinized by other states,” HENKIN , INTERNATIONAL LAW:
POLITICS AND VALUES 213 (1995), but many treaty bodies are substantially influenced by states. See
HENKIN , supra note 157, at 22.
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reservations, that states and international organizations should specify the
nature and limits to such competence, and that those formulating reservations
304
should “take fully into account” the assessments issued by those bodies.
More so than many of the other guidelines, such suggestions are subject to the
prospective choices of treaty negotiators, with the possible exception of the
suggestion that treaty bodies are competent to assess reservations simply by
virtue of their assignment to monitor application of the treaty.305 The notion
that assigning (or arrogating) such competence “neither excludes nor affects in
any other way the competence” of non-reserving states seems naïve,306 as does
styling the myriad avenues for assessment as mutually reinforcing methods of
“verifying” the compatibility of reservations with a treaty’s object and
purpose.307 For reasons previously stated, however, such assessments almost
certainly serve the interest of non-reserving states in reserving their own
subjective judgments as to acceptability, and doubtless help inform those
judgments.
Such considerations are even more apparent in the more modest, if
progressive, provisions initially adopted by the Commission to date. Treaty
bodies, particularly those associated with human rights, are depicted as taking
part in a “reservations dialogue”308 in which they urge states periodically to
309
310
review reservations and urge other states to apply pressure as well. Such

304. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶¶ 167, 171, 177, 179
(proposing, respectively, draft guidelines 3.2, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3). The Commission had previously
tabled draft guidelines providing that a reserving state must act “accordingly” in the event that a treaty
body finds its reservation impermissible, including by withdrawing its reservation. Int’l Law Comm’n,
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Fourth Session, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc.
A/57/10 (Aug. 16, 2002) (reprinting draft guideline 2.5.4); id. ¶¶ 71-76 (reviewing objections); id. ¶¶ 9599 (noting withdrawal from the drafting process by the Special Rapporteur following objections); 2005
ILC Report, supra note 7. Those objecting were concerned that the treaty body’s recommendation,
unlike a depositary’s commentary, might bind the reserving state. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Fourth Session (2002): Topical Summary of the
Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly During Its Fifty-Seventh Session, ¶¶
73-80, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/529 (Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Topical Summary 2003] (summarizing
objections voiced in the Sixth Committee). The more convincing distinction is that a treaty body’s
intervention, which might come at any point, would (for better or for worse) substantially extend the
reserving state’s risk horizon.
305. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶¶ 169-71. Notably, this
recommendation broadens the scope of the preliminary conclusion initially indicated by the
Commission, which spoke only to competence within human rights treaties. Id.
306. Id. ¶ 172 (draft guideline 3.2.4).
307. Id. ¶ 162.
308. See, e.g., 2004 ILC Report, supra note 83, ¶ 186.
309. See 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 207 (citing examples of periodic review); see,
e.g., CEDAW, Compilation of Guidelines on the Form and Content of Reports To Be Submitted by
States Parties to the International Human Rights Treaties, Second Addendum, at 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/2/Rev.1/Add.2 (May 5, 2003); The Secretary-General, Report of the Fifth Meeting of Persons
Chairing the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. A/49/537 (Oct. 19, 1994); Comm. on the
Rights of the Child, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Tenth Anniversary of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child Commemorative Meeting: Achievements and Challenges (Sept. 30-Oct. 1,
1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/10than.htm. These admonitions are focused on
reservations offending a treaty’s object and purpose, but are not necessarily limited to them. See Tyagi,
supra note 61, at 236.
310. Chairperson, CEDAW, Report of CEDAW to the General Assembly, at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/49/38 (Feb. 4, 1994) (encouraging states to enter into reservations dialogue on a bilateral basis with
those states lodging objections).
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initiatives are less intrusive and controversial than any independent and
authoritative evaluation of reservations,311 while at the same time offering
some prospect that the review will lead states to voluntarily withdraw
reservations. 312 Consistent with that depiction, the International Law
Commission has adopted a draft guideline extolling those making reservations
to “undertake a periodic review of such reservations and consider withdrawing
those which no longer serve their purpose.”313
This does little to promote the interest of non-reserving states,
traditionally (and narrowly) understood, in limiting reservations. Review is
likely to prune deadwood, such as reservations that the reserving state may no
longer need, but these were also of little continuing significance in the first
place.314 The process, however, is far more significant: periodic review can
communicate a state’s present commitment to, and understanding of, its
reservations, either of which may have evolved since the reservation was first
formulated. Indirect evidence is provided by the reports requested by some
treaty bodies, which are far more detailed than would be necessary to draw a
state’s attention to the merits of its own reservations. For example, the
Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies recently issued harmonized
guidelines that would require a reporting state to provide information of keen
interest to its non-reserving peers:
(i) The scope of [its] reservations; (ii) The reason why [they] were considered to be
necessary and have been maintained; (iii) The precise effect of the reservation in terms of
national law and policy; (iv) Whether any reservations entered . . . are consistent with
obligations with regard to the same rights set forth in other treaties; and (v) . . . any plans
to limit the effect of reservations and ultimately withdraw them within a specific time
frame.315

From an informational standpoint, the Commission’s draft guideline
seems relatively underwhelming. One difference concerns how forthcoming it
316
asks states to be. The more significant difference concerns the inquiry’s

311. Special Rapporteur, Eighth Report, supra note 62, ¶ 20 (citing observation by the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that “‘opening a legal struggle with all the
reservation States and insisting that some of their reservations have no legal effect . . . could distract the
Committee from its main task’” of promoting complete treaty application and compliance); Treaty
Bodies’ Practice, supra note 93, ¶ 17 (same).
312. Tyagi, supra note 61, at 218 (citing strategy as best means of reducing reservations, and
observing that “States do not object to such requests; they occasionally review some of their
reservations; and quite a few have withdrawn some reservations”).
313. 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 207 (reprinting draft Guideline 2.5.3).
314. The Commission has essentially acknowledged as much. See, e.g., 2003 ILC Report,
supra note 231, at 208 (explaining that it is “not . . . out of place to draw its users’ attention to the
drawbacks of these ‘forgotten,’ obsolete or superfluous reservations and the benefits of reconsidering
them periodically with a view to withdrawing them totally or partially”).
315. Fourth Inter-Committee Mtg., Geneva, Switz., June 20-22, 2005 & Seventeenth Mtg. of
the Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Geneva, Switz., June 23-24, 2005, Harmonized
Guidelines on Reporting Under the International Human Rights Treaties, Including Guidelines on a
Common Core Document and Treaty-Specific Targeted Documents, ¶ 45(b), U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2005/3
(June 1, 2005); see also Chairperson, CEDAW, Report of CEDAW to the General Assembly, supra note
310, at 14 (requiring similar degree of detail).
316. At present, guideline 2.5.3 urges states and organizations to “give consideration to the
usefulness of retaining the reservations, in particular in relation to developments in their internal law
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expression. While the draft guideline would encourage state introspection,
treaty bodies have exhorted states to provide the relevant information as part
of a reporting process, which better ensures that they and non-reserving states
can understand the reservation’s continuing basis and scope. The Commission
might likewise recommend that periodic review be accommodated within any
reporting procedure that already exists, or even recommend reporting for
purposes of reservations alone.317
The Commission’s approach to “manifestly impermissible” reservations,
which addresses the role of another non-state actor, the depositary, is also
generally consistent with a broader understanding of state interests. Under the
draft guideline, depositaries are urged to point out clear trespasses to the
reserving state; if the state maintains the reservation, the depositary circulates
318
it to other parties while “indicating the nature of legal problems” raised.
This enhances, in limited circumstances, the information afforded non319
reserving states, but the guideline is more notable for what it does not do.
Debate within the General Assembly suggested a division between those
urging a passive role for the depositary, in which it would pass on all
reservations without commentary, and those arguing that the depositary must
refuse to circulate any manifestly impermissible reservations. 320 Neither
alternative advanced the interest of non-reserving states in information. The
former tack would hinder the ability of other states to screen for important
(and legally vulnerable) reservations,321 thus impairing the very privilege of
non-reserving states that advocates of a passive depositary sought to
preserve. 322 The latter approach, while thwarting some incompatible
since the reservations were formulated,” in light of “the aim of preserving the integrity of multilateral
treaties.” 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 207.
317. For cautionary notes on the efficacy of reporting, however, see supra notes 156-160 and
accompanying text.
318. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its FiftyFourth Session, at 112, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (Aug. 16, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 ILC Report] (setting out
draft guideline 2.1.8). As the Commission indicates in its accompanying commentary, the term
“manifestly impermissible” is provisional only. Id. at 114.
319. For direct allusions to the communication function, see Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session (2001): Topical Summary of the
Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its Fifty-Seventh Session, ¶¶ 6166, A/CN.4/521 (Aug. 16, 2002).
320. Topical Summary 2003, supra note 304, ¶¶ 61-72; 2002 ILC Report, supra note 318, at
113.
321. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 23d mtg. ¶ 27, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.23 (Dec. 2,
2002) (remarks of New Zealand representative) (noting that “[m]any foreign ministries . . . would not
have the resources to verify the permissibility of every reservation of which they were notified, but a
note from the depositary would draw attention to the possible need to take a position on the reservation
in question”). Some, to be sure, would welcome this. E.g., id. ¶ 5 (remarks of Iranian representative)
(indicating that intervention by the depositary regarding incompatibility “might prompt other States to
react, which would not help to resolve the problem”).
322. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶¶ 12, 60, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/57/SR.26 (Nov. 6, 2002) (remarks of Indian and Cuban representatives); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm.,
57th Sess., 23d mtg., supra note 321, ¶¶ 5, 35, 51, 74 (remarks of Iranian, U.K., U.S., and Australian
representatives); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 22d mtg. ¶ 89, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.22 (Nov.
29, 2002) (remarks of French representative). Other commentators suggested that additional information
was consistent with the primacy of states. Id. ¶¶ 82, 94 (remarks of Swedish and Hungarian
representatives); U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 26th mtg. ¶ 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.26 (Nov.
6, 2002) (remarks of Greek representative). Defenders of a more passive role for depositaries also
opposed the draft guideline on other grounds, such as its supposed inconsistency with the limited role

2006]

Reserving

363

reservations, would also have reduced the understanding by non-reserving
states of the reserving state’s intentions and ability to comply. Yet a third
approach, the Special Rapporteur’s proposal to circulate the depositary’s
exchange of views with the reserving state, 323 which facially increased
information sharing, may go too far in invading the reserving state’s
prerogatives—reducing candor and, by discouraging reservations, reducing
the flow of information.324
The Special Rapporteur has thus far stopped short of articulating the
consequences of third-party assessment of reservations, 325 and the matter
certainly requires nuanced analysis. While one may assume that states would
prefer not to have their reservations open to additional questioning, the impact
is easily exaggerated: third-party intervention probably cannot change a
326
reserving state’s treaty obligations toward other states, but rather interferes
with the state’s ability to rely on the reservation in certain settings (for
example, in connection with state reports or interstate complaints), which
327
themselves are often contingent on the state’s willingness to cooperate.
Intervention probably also benefits states confronted by reservations, though
the matter is not free from doubt. Such intervention may increase the
information available to non-reserving states and improve their ability to
challenge, at the time and under the circumstances of their choosing, the
legitimacy and legal force of another’s reservations. At the same time,
enhancing intervention—at the extreme, by authorizing treaty bodies to sever
incompatible reservations—may, by decreasing the ability to rely on
reservations (or in lesser measures, by increasing disclosure), risk weakening
treaty terms, driving reservations underground without increasing compliance,
328
and diminishing the willingness of states to ratify. Even if discouraging

for the depositary contemplated by the Vienna Convention. See U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess.,
27th mtg., ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/57/SR.27 (Dec. 3, 2002) (remarks of Chairman of the International
Law Commission) (noting concerns, but suggesting that non-obligatory nature of the depositary’s role
should have resolved them).
323. See Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Seventh Report on Reservations to Treaties,
¶¶ 44-47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/526 (Apr. 5, 2002) (prepared by Alain Pellet).
324. See supra text accompanying notes 227-236 (noting balance necessary in effecting
disclosure). But see U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 57th Sess., 23d mtg., supra note 321, ¶ 2 (remarks of
Italian representative) (commending fact that “annexing the exchange of views to the communication . .
. would encourage States to refrain from making any reservation contrary to the object and purpose of
the treaty”).
325. See Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶ 173 (taking view that
it is more appropriate to postpone consideration of the question).
326. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. This appears consistent with the Special
Rapporteur’s most recent submissions, though the position is not entirely clear. Special Rapporteur,
Tenth Report, Second Add., supra note 7, ¶ 155 & n.375.
327. See U.K. Observations, supra note 55, ¶ 11 (describing implications of a reservation’s
assessment by the Human Rights Committee).
328. In an important article, Ryan Goodman has observed that states that would have assented
to a treaty even without the right to reserve might prefer severability to the loss of treaty relations—
especially if ratification was originally intended to lock the state into the treaty. Goodman, supra note
54, at 538-39. This probably understates the degree to which severability offends traditional
understandings of state consent. See Elena A. Baylis, Correspondence, 97 AM. J. INT’ L L. 107, 107-08
(2003). A fuller assessment of state decision-making, however, would take into account not only the
preferences of states consenting to the treaty (and, potentially, being startled by a treaty body’s decision
to sever, and even by its assertion of power to do so), but also the effect of severability’s prospect on
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reservations is the only objective, increasing third-party intervention may
inadvertently further diminish the attentiveness of states—a point the
Commission as a whole, like the Special Rapporteur, might prefer to assume
away.329
V.

CONCLUSION

The limited number of topics examined—the initial standing of
reservations, the form and timing of objections, and the effect of those
objections—is merely the tip of the iceberg. Similar consideration of rival and
complementary interests should inform the Commission’s future examination
of related questions, such as the advisability of echoing calls on states to
330
331
refrain from reservations. While often linked with pleas for withdrawal,
requests that reservations not be formulated in the first place directly suppress
disclosure, whereas reserving and then withdrawing help maximize it. Other,
more radical proposals require similar analysis, such as the use of temporal
limits on reservations. Establishing a shelf life for reservations limits their
impact, which is desirable on the conventional view; allowing reservations to
be renewed at the end of such a period sacrifices that interest somewhat, but
332
extracts from any extension a new wealth of information.
Given the years of effort the International Law Commission has invested
in studying the reservations regime, it is disconcerting to contemplate the
work still required to optimize it. A theory of non-reserving state interests
may only worsen the problem. It is difficult to aggregate the interests of a
non-reserving state with respect to one treaty, let alone for all non-reserving
states across the range of treaties that the Vienna Convention serves.
Comparing these interests to those of reserving states—more exactly,
assessing whether the safeguards against reservations serve the contingent
interests of states that will sometimes reserve themselves—is still more
difficult, and requires asking whether risk aversion, or distributional equity
states that might react by negotiating weaker treaty terms, disguising potential noncompliance, or simply
declining to ratify in the first place.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94 (discussing states’ resistance to the evaluation
of reservations by treaty bodies); 1997 ILC Report, supra note 8, at 126 ¶ 6 (stating preliminary
conclusion that “this competence of the monitoring bodies does not exclude or otherwise affect the
traditional modalities of control by the contracting parties”); cf. Special Rapporteur, Tenth Report,
Second Add., supra note 7, ¶ 153 (noting concern that consensual objection processes “do not encourage
State parties to maintain the special vigilance that can be expected of them”).
330. See, e.g., Special Rapporteur, Int’l Law Comm’n, Fourth Report on Reservations to
Treaties, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/499 (Mar. 25, 1999) (prepared by Alain Pellet) (citing correspondence
from the chairpersons of human rights bodies calling for limiting the number and scope of reservations);
World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) (encouraging “universal ratification of human rights
treaties,” but also asking states “to avoid, as far as possible, the resort to reservations”); Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1223 (1993) on Reservations Made by Member
States to Council of Europe Conventions, 51st Sitting (adopted Oct. 1, 1993) (urging Committee of
Ministers to take steps to reduce “considerably” the number of reservations to past and future Council of
Europe conventions).
331. See, e.g., Treaty Bodies’ Practice, supra note 93, ¶ 2 (noting agreement “that it was
appropriate for treaty bodies to request the withdrawal of reservations to the treaties they monitored”).
332. See 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, at 205 n.362 (providing examples of renewable and
non-renewable time-limited reservations).
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among states with different tastes and different needs, should play any role.
And the interests of states does not, of course, necessarily equate with the
333
public interest.
Further research—for example, careful canvassing of the state
representatives responsible for tendering reservations and evaluating
objections, or microlegal analysis of particular treaty negotiations—may be
helpful. But at the very least, a more sophisticated understanding of state
interests helps to imagine how the present regime may have come to pass, and
the potential costs of reforming it. Commentary sometimes supposes that a
treaty necessarily exists as it has been negotiated (if falling short of the ideal
degree of commitment and enforceability), and among the parties that have in
fact ratified it (again, at worst). This tends to resolve the question of
reservations before it has been asked: on this view, reservations are
unfortunate concessions to demanding norms that other states are willing to
shoulder, submitted by states that would otherwise acquiesce. Since the
Genocide Convention opinion, if not before, many have been skeptical of this
account—realizing that states sometimes require reservations to participate in
a treaty, which redounds to the benefit of treaty participants as a whole—but
at a loss to explain the volume of rent conceded by non-reserving to reserving
states.
The account in this article is intended as a partial corrective, perhaps
helping to explain some of the unusual contours of the Vienna Convention
regime. The argument may also inform the regime’s reexamination. At the
most general level, it suggests that the regime’s perceived indulgence of
reservations is not necessarily as hostile to non-reserving states as has been
supposed, which may be useful in sustaining the International Law
Commission’s somewhat conservative approach to its project. At the same
time, it cautions that even the lowest hanging fruit may not be as attractive as
supposed. While the Commission, like any group of lawyers, has considered
334
clarification to be an unmitigated good, it should consider whether reducing
the uncertainty for reserving states, and constraining self-help and innovation
by non-reserving states, is consistent with the arc of the regime’s evolution to
date.
The expansive view of the interests of non-reserving states may also be
suggestive for other work. Compliance studies, for example, often reach
depressing conclusions regarding the pull of international obligations, or
alternatively provide little insight into why states appear to abide by their
obligations. Pushing the envelope of the state interests involved—considering,
for example, the interests that states have in learning about their peers, or in
maximizing their discretion within a legal framework—may help us
understand that states often get exactly what they want, so long as what they

333. Cf. BAIRD, supra note 172, at 124-25 (distinguishing between signaling function and social
benefit).
334. See, e.g., 2003 ILC Report, supra note 231, ¶ 362 (proclaiming opposition to
“uncertainties or misunderstandings,” and stating that “[r]eserving States and others, whether they object
or not, must know where they stand and what the real objections are by comparison with responses to
reservations which are not objections”).
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want is properly reckoned, and that these interests may already be
accommodated within international law.

